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ABSTRACT
The influence of corporate money in politics is one of the most studied topics 
in political science in the U.S., although not so much so in recent democra-
cies. Using new and public data from Brazilian elections, this dissertation 
investigates the process of institutional change that culminated in a 2015 
decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court to ban corporate donations as a legal 
source of financing to politicians and parties. The episode exemplifies the 
worldwide tendency of “judicialization of politics” and fits the pattern of 
change identified by the literature as a “critical juncture,” understood as a 
relatively short period of time in which there is a heightened probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest. Under exceptional circum-
stances of political and economic crisis, actors not institutionally in charge of 
law making set in motion a process of legislative change whose final outcome 
was not a faithful reflection of their preferences, but was deeply influenced by 
contingent elements. Public support in a context of severe revelations of 
corruption schemes explains how the Supreme Court was able to rule against
iv
the immediate interest of politicians and how the latter, having adjusted to
find additional sources of money, were unwilling to reinstate corporate dona-
tion as a legal means of campaign financing. Having confirmed in Chapter
two that incumbency is associated in Brazil with a negative effect on the
electoral performance of office holders while the use of corporate money by
candidates is legal, the dissertation examines the effects of the Supreme Court
decision on municipal elections held after it came into effect. We investigate
whether removing this important source of funding for both incumbents and
challengers swings the balance in favor of office holders in both majority
and proportional elections held in 2016. We find evidence that the ban on
corporate donations favored incumbent mayors, suggesting that the historic
decision, instead of levelling the playing field between incumbents and chal-
lengers, in reality helped office holders to win an additional term. It was
not immediately visible due to the particular conditions in which the 2016
elections took place, when voters were particularly angry at incumbents due
to the widespread news of corruption involving party officials. These findings
indicate that, despite its intention to make Brazilian elections more competi-
tive and open, the historic Supreme Court decision might have had the exact
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In September 2015, the majority of justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court
(Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) voted for the complete banning of corpo-
rate donations as a lawful source of financing to political campaigns. The
historical decision was reached after four years since the Brazilian Bar Asso-
ciation (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, OAB) had filed a petition in court
questioning the constitutionality of this type of donations. According to the
OAB, the high costs of campaigns in Brazil created a situation in which
candidates with scarce material resources had few chances of winning office.
Still worse, it worked as a powerful incentive for candidates to come close to
corporations in search of funds, raising questions about the future relations
between public agents and private firms.
Indeed, in the years that followed the filing of the petition by the OAB,
revelations emerging from investigations carried out by public prosecutors
made Brazilian citizens once again painfully aware of an intricate web of
corruption involving politicians, public agents and executives in public and
1
private companies. The political significance of the revelations was such that
it contributed to the eviction from office of the then President of Brazil,
Dilma Rousseff, as well as the Workers’ Party after twelve years in power.
It is now six years since the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled against the
legality of corporate donations. Since then, three elections have taken place,
in 2016 (for mayors and city councils), 2018 (for president, state governors,
federal and state deputies) and 2020 (for mayors and city councils). Never-
theless, a number of questions related to that historical ruling still remain
that were not yet properly or sufficiently analyzed by political scientists. This
work aims at tackling some of these questions.
Firstly, we still lack complete clarity on how the institutional change
happened, more precisely, how the end result of complete proscription of
corporate donations by the court was achieved, especially in view of its vital
importance to so many politicians eager to access resources to fund their
campaigns. Politicians, activists, experts and magistrates had for years been
aware of the controversial aspects of corporate financing, but institutional
change remained elusive nevertheless. In 2015, when the Brazilian Supreme
Court put an end to years of frustrated attempts at reforming the electoral
legislation and ruled against the best interest of the political establishment,
analysts and observers asked themselves how this result could have been
finally achieved.
Secondly, the main stated purpose of the historic Supreme Court deci-
sion to ban corporate financing in Brazilian Elections was, in the words of the
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rapporteur of the case, to level the playing field among candidates. However,
after five years since the ruling was handed down, its practical consequences
are still unclear. In Brazil, elections are highly competitive and the elec-
toral system creates strong incentives for candidates to run individualistic
campaigns and distinguish themselves from their peers in the eyes of voters.
It is hence plausible that instead of making elections more democratic, re-
moving corporate donations actually decreased the chances of challengers by
shifting the weight toward candidates that enjoyed other types of advantages
identified by the literature, chief among them incumbency (Erikson (1971);
Gelman and King (1990); Cox and Katz (1996); Ansolabehere et al. (2000);
Lee (2008); and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009)).
Indeed, incumbency advantage is one of the most studied topics in po-
litical science in the US. There are methodological problems related to esti-
mating the effects of incumbency, mostly due to confounding factors, but the
literature has found ways to tackle them (Levitt 1994, Levitt and Wolfram
1997, Lee 2008, Linden 2004). The literature on incumbency advantage in
developing countries, however, is not so well developed (Uppal 2005, Titiu-
nik 2009, Boas and Hidalgo 2011, Brambor and Ceneviva 2011, Klasnja and
Titiunik 2017). One issue in particular has inspired a few studies in de-
veloped countries, but remain absent in studies about recent democracies:
the relation between incumbency, electoral systems and the attribution of
responsibility by voters, i.e., if and how any effect of incumbency relates to
whether seats are won according to a majority election - as it is the case of
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executive and, in some countries, also legislative positions - or a proportional
election - mostly legislative posts.
These are relevant questions to study the effects of the Brazilian Supreme
Court that banned corporate donations. In Brazil - as in most other coun-
tries -, executive positions are filled according to a majoritarian rule, while
legislative posts are filled in open list proportional contests. Incumbents in
executive posts face electoral challenges that are distinct from legislative of-
ficials, and voters usually attribute responsibility differently in both cases.
While holders of executive posts are considered individually responsible for
government policies and held accountable for them, responsibility in the case
of legislators is diffuse and the average voter finds it harder to identify who
to reward or to blame (Dettman, Pepinsky & Pieskalla, 2017).
Hence, the Supreme Court decision raises questions about its possible
impact on incumbents running for reelection. Once candidates can no longer
rely on money received from corporations - something that in theory could
put challengers financially on an equal foot to incumbents-, have the electoral
advantages of holding office led to a better electoral performance - as the US
literature would make us expect - or has incumbency become a greater hurdle
for politicians searching for a second term - as the literature in developing
countries suggests? Finally, regardless of whether the STF decision affected
the performance of incumbents seeking reelection positively or negatively,
was this effect similar or different in the case of incumbents running for
executive positions in majority elections (mayors) and incumbents running
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for legislative posts in proportional contests (city councils)?
Money was - and still is - one key element in electoral contests in many
countries, including Brazil. The influence and role of firms cannot be overes-
timated in this context. Using new and previously available data, I propose
to analyze the institutional change that took place in the country in 2015 and
its effects on municipal elections in 2016. By doing so I hope to contribute
to the literature on electoral studies in developing countries and help others
find ways to improve electoral rules in Brazil.
This thesis is divided in three major chapters. The first chapter draws on
the literature on institutional change and critical junctures to explain how
and why Brazil moved to an electoral system that did not allow for corpo-
rate donations. For this chapter I have conducted interviews with some of
the actors directly involved in the process of institutional change, including
two justices and a former justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court. The con-
tent of these interviews helped me understand that the institutional change
process fits into the pattern of what the political science literature describes
as “judicialization of politics” (Hirschl 2011) and “critical junctures” (Collier
and Munck 2017).
The two subsequent chapters use observational data publicly available
to check the effects of incumbency on electoral performance in both major-
ity and proportional elections while corporate donations are permissible and
when they no longer are allowed. While the second chapter aims at identify-
ing an overall effect of incumbency on electoral performance when candidates
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have free access to corporate donations, i.e., before the historic decision of
the Supreme Court, the last chapter investigates the persitence and the mag-
nitude of this effect after it. Assuming that incumbency exerts some effect
on electoral performance, the second chapter investigates how relevant it was
to be an incumbent in elections held in 2012, when all contestants had access
to corporate donations. In this chapter our main finding confirms the nega-
tive effect of incumbency on the electoral performance - the vote share - of
incumbent candidates. This effect is particularly noteworthy in the case of
mayors, who are responsible for the executive branch in Brazilian cities and
are, hence, accountable for a number of public services that draw immediate
public attention.
Departing from the baseline established in this chapter, in the following
final chapter I investigate whether the effect found of incumbency remained
the same in elections held in 2016, when candidates no longer received do-
nations from firms and when, at least in theory, incumbency became a more
influential factor in the contest. Our initial findings pointed to an increase
in the negative effect of incumbency, suggesting the opposite of our initial
expectation, that is, that the ban on corporate donation had actually harmed
incumbent candidates further. However, a closer investigation showed that
the negative effective of incumbency in 2016 was inversely proportional to
the amount of corporate money raised by Brazilian mayors. For them, the
more money was raised in 2012, the smaller the negative effect in 2016. In-
cumbent mayors had raised, on average, more corporate money in 2012 than
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challengers. Among them, those who were the top beneficiaries were the least
negatively affected in their vote shares in the following elections. We did not
find such correlation in the case of city council candidates.
We attribute the overall increase in the negative effect of incumbency to
the general dissatisfaction of voters with incumbents in general. Revelations
of massive corruption schemes as of 2014, although focused on politicians
at the federal level, also influenced the behavior of voters in municipal elec-
tions. However, the fact that incumbent mayors with more access to cor-
porate money suffered from a smaller negative effect on their vote shares
is, I believe, a clear indication that the ban actually helped candidates in
office, contributing thus to their continuation in power and making it harder
for newcomers to win elections. Our findings raise doubts about the effec-
tiveness of the Supreme Court decision in levelling the playing field among






In 2015, the Brazilian Supreme Court banned corporate donations as a lawful
source of financing to political campaigns. Previously existing legislation
that allowed companies to donate to candidates and parties was declared
unconstitutional. As a consequence of the decision by the Court, municipal
elections in 2016 in Brazil took place in a different setting, as candidates
could no longer use corporate money to finance their campaigns and had to
organize their funding relying solely on their own money (self-funding), public
funds transferred by the federal government or contributions by individual
citizens.
The rapporteur of the case in the Supreme Court, Justice Luiz Fux, stated
that the rising costs of campaigns is responsible for the fact that the candidate
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who spends more has a greater chance of being elected.1 In prohibiting this
type of contribution, the Supreme Court was allegedly leveling the playing
field among candidates and strengthening the chances of contestants who
were not in a position to raise a lot of money.
Although arguments against corporate donations were not new in 2015
among Brazilian politicians, scholars and the media, it is far from clear how
the historical and political institutional barriers to reform were surmounted
at that point. Why did Brazilian elites move to a campaign financing system
that excluded corporate donations? How did such an important change come
about? In view of its tremendous importance to the political survival of
politicians in Brazil (see below), how can we explain that the Supreme Court
ruled against the interest of politicians, and Congress was unable to reinstate
corporate donations as a legal source of financing after the decision of the
court banning it, despite having the institutional prerogative to do so? We
still lack a proper understanding of the reasons behind such a change as
well as of the way it took place, leading some aspects of the regime to be
modified, while others - like the limits to contributions by individual citizens
- remained untouched.
In this chapter, I attempt to provide an answer to these questions using
the the theoretical framework of critical junctures, understood as a relatively
short period of time in which there is a substantially heightened probability
1The full text of the decision is available for consultation at the site of the Brazilian
Supreme Court, www.stf.jus.br.
9
that agents’ choices will affect the outcomes of interest (Capoccia and Kele-
men, 2007) or, to put it in accordance with a more recent definition by two
leading scholars in the field, (1) a major episode of institutional innovation,
(2) occurring in distinct ways, (3) and generating an enduring legacy (Collier
and Munck 2017).
Using a critical juncture framework to analyze political events presents
some challenges though. For instance, analysts agree on the importance of
hindsight to develop a proper argument based on this type of framework.
As pointed out by Boas (2017), the lack of temporal distance may raise
serious questions about the endurance of the outcome being analyzed and,
ultimately, whether the argument proposed can be sustained. While this
is certainly true, Boas himself recognizes that the use of a critical juncture
framework in a more tentative setting, when enough time might not yet have
elapsed, is far from useless. In cases like these, he advises scholars to rely
on criteria - such as whether the change was incremental or happened in a
similar way in different countries - that do not require the identification of
an enduring legacy in order to make their claim plausible (Boas 2017).
One of the reasons for the fact that the critical junctures approach is use-
ful in our case is that the change in the Brazilian regime happened relatively
fast once a specific sequence of events was set in motion by the Brazilian Bar
Association (OAB), after it brought the issue to the attention of the Supreme
Court (STF) through an injunction (ADIN 4650). My basic argument is that
although reforming the rules for campaign financing had been in the minds
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of political actors for years, getting it approved in Congress was highly im-
probable, as many politicians depended heavily on the donations of firms to
win office. Discussions about banning corporate donations had dragged in
Congress for years and politicians were unable to come to a final conclusion
on it in view of the importance of this source of funds for their own political
survival.
However, during Dilma’s second term, the conjunction of certain ele-
ments created the necessary conditions for the reform to take place. As the
political system became increasingly dysfunctional due to the suspension of
regular patterns of interaction between the Executive and the Legislative in
coalitional presidentialism, the role of the STF in domestic politics became
increasingly salient. Requests that could not be solved in parliament were
directed to the Court, strengthening a tendency of “judicialization of poli-
tics” initiated years before. The OAB saw in this a window of opportunity
and filed an injunction which gave the STF the chance to once again exert
the enlarged role it had recently acquired in Brazilian politics. The decision
of the court locked in an outcome which proved difficult to change, despite
attempts of politicians to do so while the proceedings were still pending in
court and even after the STF came to a final decision.
Crucial to the understanding of the process of change was the under-
mining of regular patters of Brazilian democracy during Dilma Rousseff’s
presidency and the increased role assumed by the Supreme Court (STF).
Indeed, analysts have over the years identified some peculiar features of the
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so-called Brazilian coalition presidentialism (presidencialismo de coalizão)
that explain how democracy works in the country: strong legislative powers
of the presidency combined with a highly fragmented party system resulting
in the need to forge large cross-parties coalitions in Congress for the system
to work (Abranches 1988, Ames 2001, Mainwaring 2006). For reasons to be
explained below, these regular patterns were subverted in the years of the
second Dilma presidency, easing the way for interested parties to bring to
the Supreme Court issues of political importance.
Following a worldwide tendency (Hirschl, 2011), magistrates of the Brazil-
ian Supreme Court (STF) armed with specific and broad judicial review pro-
cedures were asked to resolve a range of issues of political nature, including
electoral outcomes and processes. The judicialization of politics is a mani-
fold phenomenon whose reasons are many, like institutional features, judicial
behavior and political determinants (Guarnieri et al 2002, Ferejohn 2002,
Taylor 2008). In the Brazilian case, a combination of judicial willingness
to engage in public policy-making with a relatively dysfunctional political
system in Rousseff’s time are behind the change we want to explain.
However, there are other aspects involved in understanding how magis-
trates were able to rule against the broad interest of politicians. The purpose
of constitutional courts is to oversee and constrain the exercise of political
power by legislative majorities or government agencies (Vanberg 2001). How-
ever, the literature points out that if high courts strongly depend on other
bodies to implement their decisions, they also risk a cost when adopting a
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position against a law-making majority, as it may lead to loss of trust among
the public as a result of the perception that the balance of the constitu-
tional system was upset (Caldeira 1986). In addition, high court decisions
are not neutral with regards to public perception and the political landscape
at large. There is abundant evidence of the influence of public opinion in
courts, even if the exact forms that influence takes is subject to investiga-
tion (Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal and
Spaeth 2002).
As the revelations brought about the so-called Car Wash investigations
(Investigação Lava Jato) unveiled links between politicians, parties and firms,
magistrates were aware that their decision counted with general public sup-
port and even support from part of the political establishment (members of
left wing parties mostly). The magistrates who ruled against the constitu-
tionality of corporate donation believed that they were promoting a positive
change in the workings of Brazilian democracy. They were also aware that
the public in general did consider corporate donations to be a major source of
corruption within the political system and that not all politicians in Congress
were prepared to openly fight for this type of funding after the decision was
made by the court (section below).
As for Congress’ failure to reinstate the annulled legislation, we need to
consider the factors accounting for the behavior of “reelection seeking” agents
when considering challenging a Supreme Court decision, especially if the
decision enjoys public support. The “electoral connection” (Mayhew 1974)
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seems thus to have been a crucial factor for the enforcement of Supreme Court
decision abolishing corporate donations in the Brazilian case. Faced with
the constraints created by losing access to corporate money, these politicians
would search for alternative ways to increase revenue, boosting the amount
of public money available to fund campaigns as a sort of compensation for
their loss.
In applying a critical juncture approach to explain institutional variation
(the change in the electoral legislation), three distinct stages of develop-
ment should be identified, according to Roberts (2014): a) the antecedent
conditions (the prevailing regime before change, when the behavior and ex-
pectation of actors was conditioned, among other factors, by the lawful use
of corporate donations); b) the critical juncture itself (the window of oppor-
tunity generated by the collapse of patterns of behavior in Brazilian coalition
presidentialism, giving the judiciary enough space to act as an agent of sud-
den institutional change); and c) the aftermath period, when the legacy of
the outcome is established.
This chapter is structured according to these distinct stages. In section
2.2 I present a brief overview of the characteristics of the Brazilian electoral
system and discuss the circumstances that led politicians to legalize corporate
donations. The following section (section 2.3) is dedicated to several elements
of the “critical juncture” moment. After briefly discussing the role of the
Workers’ Party (PT) in the crisis that would follow, I comment on the second
term of President Dilma Rousseff. My objective is to show how institutional
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patterns that used to regulate interactions between the executive and the
legislative were disrupted and how, under these exceptional circumstances,
an opportunity for change was created that ultimately led to the declaration
of unconstitutionality of legislation allowing firms to donate to candidates.
In section 2.4 I discuss the sequence of events and what could have happened
differently, bearing in mind that although a legacy of institutional change
was produced, we probably have not had enough time to consider it to be
enduring. In section 2.5 I conclude the chapter.
2.1.1 Interviews
In order to carry out my analysis, I have relied on interviews carried out with
actors involved in the process of legislation change. These interviews were
made either in view of the direct involvement of the interviewee with the
episode of legislation change and/or his technical expertise on the issue at
hand. I have managed to interview two magistrates of the Brazilian Supreme
Court (Justices Lúıs Roberto Barroso and Gilmar Mendes), as well as two
out of the three lawyers signatories of the injunction that the Brazilian Bar
Association (OAB) filed at the STF. One of them was the President of the
OAB at the time (Ophir Cavalcante Junior); the other was a senior member
of the association (Cláudio Pereira de Souza Neto). Three other interviews
were conducted with academics/experts who participated in a public hearing
held at the premises of the Supreme Court prior to the beginning of the pro-
ceedings of the ADIN 4650 and/or who routinely publish work on Brazilian
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electoral system (Conrado Hübner Mendes, Martonio Mont’Alverne Barreto
Lima and Bruno Speck). One former member of the STF, who served from
1997 to 2006, was also interviewed (Justice Nelson Jobim).
2.2 Antecedents: corporate donations in Brazil-
ian elections
Brazilian campaigns are among the most expensive in the world. The reasons
for this fact are many, involving a combination of electoral rules with the
incentives they create to politicians in a highly competitive environment.
After democratization in 1985, Brazilian elections have become increas-
ingly competitive. Brazilian parties, on the other hand, were and remained
weak in the subsequent decades, lacking strong organizational capacity or
ideological coherence (Samuels 2001, Mainwaring 1997). The only exception
was the Workers’ Party which, as will be seen, later resorted to practices
similar to those of their opponents in order to reach office and govern. Over
the years, the number of parties and candidates competing in legislative elec-
tions increased steadily. From 1982 to 1998, the number of parties rose from
2.4 to 8.1, while the number of running candidates per seat jumped from 3.2
to 6.6 (Samuels 2001).
Moreover, the electoral rules put in place by the 1988 Constitution worked
as a strong incentive for politicians to run individualistic campaigns (Shugart
and Carey 1995, Samuels 2001). The structural weakness of parties and the
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fact that majority elections tend to take place in vast territories with large
constituencies stimulate candidates to do whatever they can to differentiate
themselves from their peers. In the case of proportional elections, a com-
bination of open-list representation with large district magnitudes works as
an incentive in the same direction, as candidates to legislative posts have to
compete against both their listmates and opposing parties’ candidates.
As politicians looked into new sources of finance to run more personal-
ized campaigns, corporate money emerged as an obvious alternative. Firms
donated money for politicians out of a number of reasons: ideological pref-
erences, social ties to the recipients or a wish to get closer to those in power,
not rarely in expectation of future rewards (government contracts, approval
of legislation favorable to their interests, etc.).
From a contextualist point of view, however, legalization of corporate fi-
nancing in Brazil was presented by politicians not as an answer to the need
of further resources to campaign, but as means to increase transparency in
managing campaign accounts, after a serious corruption scandal that led to
the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 related to
undisclosed contributions by various sources.2 Prior to that, the impossibil-
ity of firms to legally contribute to political campaigns had been highlighted
by politicians as a major flaw in Brazilian legislation and a continuous source
2The scandal involved the campaign treasurer of the President, Paulo César Farias,
“PC Farias”, who masterminded a pervasive corruption scheme during Collor’s tenure
in office. The scheme dated back to the presidential campaign days, when PC Farias
collected money from firms and individuals to fund the campaign, amassing huge amounts
that largely surpassed what was actually spent.
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of irregularities in individual campaign accounts. It was argued that mak-
ing these contributions legal would greatly improve transparency and help
bringing to light spurious relations between companies and politicians. It
goes without saying that legalization would also offer candidates a legitimate
way to raise the money they needed to distinguish themselves from their
peers.
The final report of the Inquiry Parliamentary Commission on the so called
PC Farias case, when addressing the impossibility of firms to donate legally,
stated that “these prohibitions have generated a lot of criticism, being consid-
ered by some an invitation to malfeasance. This point has been at the center
of the discussions about the flaws of current legislation, making one wonder
whether the legalization of corporate contributions would greatly contribute
to further transparency and public morality of political campaigns”. The
report suggested that legislators consider legalizing donations by firms, but
only within certain - broad - limits. It also suggested a number of measures
to strengthen the oversight of campaign accounts and the criminalization of
specific conducts by politicians (Congresso Nacional, 1992).
In the years that followed the impeachment of President Fernando Collor
de Mello in the aftermath of the PC Farias case, the Brazilian Congress did
approve legislation changing the rules of campaign financing. Following the
report’s conclusions, Congress enabled firms to contribute to campaigns with
amounts not exceeding 2% of total revenues earned the year before the elec-
tions (Law 9.504/97, Lei das Eleições or Electoral Law). Donations could
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be made directly to candidates or to parties. In the latter case, parties were
allowed to distribute the revenues to fund multiple candidates, in confor-
mity with their statues and legal provisions (Law 9.096/95, Lei dos Partidos
Poĺıticos or Law for Political Parties). Fueled by corporate money, the bud-
get of campaigns rose at each subsequent election, meeting the growing needs
of candidates (table 1).
Table 2.1: Federal Legislative Elections - Lower House - 2002 to 2014
Year parties candidates seats total budget cost of vote*
2002 30 4902 513 R$ 186,404,318 R$ 2.37
2006 29 5660 513 R$ 407,924,435 R$ 4.83
2010 27 6028 513 R$ 862,383,357 R$ 9.65
2014 32 6175 513 R$ 1,082,277,287 R$ 12,13
Source: Transparência Brasil, www.asclaras.org
: * cost of vote is calculated dividing the total amount spent in the legislative election by the
total number of votes cast for the seats under dispute in that election.
The new legislation offered firms legal benchmarks to donate money to
politicians and parties, turning corporate donations into the most significant
source of funds for candidates. In 2014, for example, corporate donations
accounted for 73% of all the money raised by candidates running for congress
(table 2).
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Table 2.2: Sources of financing - 2014 Legislative
Elections
source amount (R$) %
firms 3,031,864,138.09 72.92
individuals 556,860,093.90 13,39
own resources 377,006,656.10 9.07
public funds 189,346,946.12 4.55
internet donations 1,591,836.42 0.04
unidentified donations 641,549.83 0.02
other 455,223.00 0.01
total 4,157,766,443.98 100,00
Source: Supreme Electoral Court, www.tse.jus.br
In view of the huge importance of corporate money to politicians, how is
it possible that just a year later this type of contribution would be declared
in violation of the Brazilian constitution by the Supreme Court? Why was
Congress unable to reinstate the legality of corporate donations, in spite of
the attempt of congressmen to do so and the importance of this source of
financing for their political survival?
As it will become clear in the following sections, outlawing corporate
donations was the outcome of an initiative by the Brazilian Bar Association
(OAB/DF) to take to the Brazilian Supreme Count an issue over which
Congress had not managed to come to a decision after years of deliberation.
This was only possible because of the enlarged role played by the STF in
recent years, a role the Supreme Court exerted in parallel to the suspension
during Dilma’s second term of the regular patterns of collaboration between
the President and Congress.
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2.3 The Critical Juncture
2.3.1 The Worker’s Party
Perhaps no specific event is more symbolic of the dimensions of the crisis
that broke out in 2015-2016 than the trajectory of the Workers’ Party (PT),
the party of President Dilma Rousseff and her predecessor, Lula. This is
so because the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002, when the PT
reached the presidency for the first time after decades of frustrated attempts,
represented a milestone in modern Brazilian history. Being the only ideolog-
ically coherent, internally democratic and disciplined party in Brazil’s politi-
cal landscape, the PT had a strong basis in grassroots movements and stood
for incorruptibility and the rejection of exclusionary political and economic
practices.
However, as indicated by Goldfrank and Wampler (2017), to reach power
and to govern the PT increasingly resorted to traditional practices and tac-
tics - including corruption and money laundering schemes - that were no
different from those employed by its adversaries. Already in 2002, when
Lula was elected, private firms contributed handsomely for the party for the
first time and the PT candidate was able to raise more money than all the
other candidates, including the candidate of the incumbent party. Donations
included not only official contributions, but also off-the-books donations of
huge amounts.
Failing to reform campaign financing laws prior to 2002, the PT badly
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needed funding for the 2002 elections, the year it had the first real chance
of winning office due to unpopularity of the incumbent, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. Prior to 2002, private firms had invested large sums in keeping the
PT out of office, but this time they decided to support both the candidate
of the incumbent party and the challenger as a way to make sure they would
have ties to whomever won the election.
Besides resources for campaigns, in the case of PT the practices also in-
volved “parallel finance networks” as well as kickback mechanisms designed
to build support in Congress. The party faction that effectively controlled
the PT since 1984 and to which Lula and his supporters belonged was re-
sponsible for moving the party away from its original grassroots origins and
moderating its campaign platforms in order to appeal to larger audiences
during elections. It also designed a finance network scheme that directed
official and unofficial resources to its members against more leftist members
of the party. As evidence for this, Goldfrank and Wampler (2017) remind
that the first corruption scandals involving the PT emerged in cities whose
mayors belonged to Lula’s faction.
After the scandal that brought President Collor de Mello down, another
scheme became public in 2005, this time involving Lula and the PT - the first
large scale scandal of the PT and its founder. As investigations showed, ille-
gal contributions in exchange of favors, often much above the legal limits and
made to competing candidates, continued to be a normal practice in Brazil-
ian political campaigns. The media called the scheme mensalão, a word in
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Portuguese meaning “big monthly stipend” and coined to designate clandes-
tine payments made by the Workers’ Party to congressmen in exchange of
support for its legislative agenda. The money used for payment came from
public funds through fake advertising contracts signed by state-owned com-
panies. The scandal brought down the chief of staff of president Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva, José Dirceu, Lula’s lifelong ally and supporter and another
major figure within the party’s cadres, who was forced to resign neverthe-
less. It also tained the public image of the President and the Workers’ Party,
considered up to that moment to be the only big party not to get involved
in systemic corruption. The scandal reinforced the public’s perception of the
enduring pernicious effect of corporate money in politics.
Other scandals followed though. The largest one involved senior directors
of the state oil company Petrobras inflating the costs of building contracts in
exchange of bribes. Contractors would channel part of the money received
from the state oil company to lobbyists and money launderers, who would
in turn distribute it to PT’s coalitional partners. Many contractors involved
in this scandal - nicknamed petrolão or “big oil” by the press - were key
contributors to the campaigns of Lula and Dilma, and had also donated to
their rivals, as it is usual in Brazilian politics.
From that moment on, the issue of campaign financing became once again
a major topic in Congress, being part of the discussions about various polit-
ical reform projects that would be analyzed for years inside the house, with-
out any practical result. Right after the mensalão scandal, President Lula da
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Silva asked his close ally and then Minister of Justice, Márcio Thomas Bas-
tos, to send to Congress an ambitious bill proposing a wide political reform
that included the elimination of corporate donations and the establishment
of a system of funding using exclusively public funds. However, that bill,
as well as a number of subsequent proposals from congressmen in the Lower
and Upper Houses, failed to bear fruit. Attempts at reforming financing
legislation were rejected in Congress one after the other in 2005, 2009, 2011
and 2015.3 In 2011 and 2015 the bills even reached the floor, but there was
not enough votes to agree on the elimination of corporate donations and on
changing other features of the national electoral system.
The obstacles to reform in Congress were manifold. Positions were far
apart on a number of key-issues. The PT had received contributions from
companies on the way to office and relied on them to win elections and to
build support in Congress through kickback schemes, but on the record it
joined forces with other left-wing parties to defend campaign financing mostly
through public funds; smaller and bigger parties from the center and center-
right - like the PSDB, the PMDB and the Democratas - considered that
the acceptance of mixed regime of public and private contributions from
individuals and firms was the only reasonable way to finance increasingly
costly campaigns. For the latter, to completely give up private firm’s sources
3Besides proposals to reform the financing rules, there were initiatives on different as-
pects of the electoral system, including the introduction of closed lists for proportional
elections, the introduction of the single non-transferable vote, the creation of more strin-
gent overseeing mechanisms for finance accounts, among others.
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of contributions would mean the end of any future political career.
The deadlock in Congress was only broken in 2015, when the Supreme
Court ruled favorably on a petition from the Brazilian Federal Bar Associ-
ation that questioned the legality, in face of the Brazilian Constitution, of
corporate donations as a source of financing to campaigns. At this point
there was little doubt that the ruling Workers’ Party had betrayed some of
the core principles that had accounted for its strong appeal in the 1990s. How
was this possible? In order to fully understand this change, we need to focus
on the combination of a very specific and unusual context of uncertainty with
the action of interest-driven actors besides congress and the executive, actors
- like the Supreme Court and the OAB - whose influence had increased over
the years, giving them a renewed role in Brazilian politics.
2.3.2 Uncertainty, the Executive and the Legislative
The Supreme Court decision came about amidst uncertainty generated by a
severe political and economic crisis. At the center of this crisis was a mo-
mentary dealignment between the executive and the legislative branches in
the final years of the presidency of Dilma Rousseff (2014-2016), causing the
executive to face greater difficulty to approve bills and ultimately undermin-
ing the way the political system had worked for the last two decades. This
momentary dealignment ran parallel to an increasing judicialization of rele-
vant political issues - including of course the issue of campaign financing -,
leading the judiciary to act as a final arbiter on issues over which politicians
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were unable to act.
The Brazilian political system is characterized by a combination of a
highly fragmented party system with strong legislative powers given to the
President by the Constitution. The strong legislative powers of the president
were enshrined in the 1988 Constitution and include a large number of pre-
rogatives. In their seminal study, Shugart and Carey (1992) ranked the 1988
Constitution second – among the 43 examined–, in terms of the vastness and
scope of powers granted to the President. The Presidency has, for instance,
the exclusive power to issue provisional decrees (“medidas provisórias”) with
the force of law for 60 days, extendable for another 60 days. In case they are
not approved/rejected by Congress within 45 days, provisional decrees will
go to the top of the agenda, preventing legislators from considering other
bills. The presidency also has vast agenda powers. It has exclusive initiative
over a number of issues, including the budget and administrative matters.
Congress must approve or reject the budget proposed by the President and
cannot initiate programs or projects not included in it, unless an amendment
process is initiated by legislators. Finally, the President is able to partially or
totally veto bills approved by Congress and has a wide range of resources at
his/her disposal, discretionary control over the budget and the appointment
of key positions within the administration.
Moreover, the electoral system is responsible for a highly fragmented
party system, as it combines proportional representation with a low thresh-
old and districts of high magnitude. In Brazil, to win a seat, a party or a
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coalition must reach a minimum of votes calculated as the total number of
votes divided by the number of seats open for contest. There is no national
threshold and, in practice, parties and coalitions obtain seats with extremely
low percentages of the national vote. The states and the federal district are
considered as electoral districts for both chambers.
As a consequence of fragmentation, the number of seats controlled by
parties, including the party of the President, is usually small. Because of the
way the system works, parties simply do not have enough seats to achieve
majority. For this reason, Presidents have to build cross-party coalitions to
implement their policies, something usual in Brazilian politics (Abranches
1988). Already during campaigns, presidential candidates try to win the
support of several parties. Once the election is over, the newly elected presi-
dent creates a broad coalition offering those parties who supported him/her
resources and cabinet positions.
Whether this type of coalition presidentialism (presidencialismo de coalizão)
is a structural source of instability and paralysis (Abranches 1988, Main-
waring 2006, Ames 2001) or allows enough room for the executive and the
legislative to coordinate and govern (Limongi 1998, Figueiredo 2001, Rennó
2006) is an open question. The fact of the matter is, however, that since the
end of military rule no Brazilian President was able to govern without a solid
coalition in Congress. Table 3.7 below gives an idea of this phenomenon, as
it displays the number of congressmen supporting the government at the be-
ginning and at the end of each term for Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Luiz
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Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, which had the lowest degree of
support among the three presidents.4
Table 2.3: Number of Coalition mem-
bers by term, 1995-2016
Beginning End
FHC (1994-97) 289 394
FHC (1998-02) 348 327
Lula (2003-06) 219 333
Lula (2007-10) 325 320
Dilma (2011-14) 326 278
Dilma (2015-16) 289 215
The table displays the number of supporters of the
presidential coalition in the Lower House at the be-
ginning and at the end of each term. The Lower
House is composed of 513 seats.
Source: Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planeja-
mento, CEBRAP
4Actually from the three presidents Dilma was the only one who suffered a strong loss
of support over her presidency and in each term individually.
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In 2014 Dilma Rousseff was elected for a second term against the main
candidate of the opposition, Aécio Neves, in the closest presidential race in
Brazilian history. In 2006, when President Lula was reelected, his margin
of victory against the opposition candidate Geraldo Alckmin was 21.66%.
The following election (2010), when Dilma was elected for the first time, this
difference shrank to 12.1%. In 2014 the margin of victory reached its lowest
point, at 3.28%. Almost half of voters did not support her. In a climate
of strong political polarization, she was reelected with 51.64% of the votes
against 48.36% for her opponent.
Shortly before the reelection of Rousseff Brazil witnessed a number of
protests initially motivated by the announcement of increases in the fares of
public transportation. Protests rapidly evolved towards more broad demands
that included the curbing of political corruption and became widespread
throughout the country. Protests were also motivated by the revelations -
which would continue to plague the President during her second term in
office - brought about by investigations under the so called Lava Jato (Car
Wash) operation, which disclosed a web of corruption involving payments
worth 5 billion dollars to company executives and political parties, including
members of the Workers’ Party and its coalition allies.
As a way to answer to protesters, President Rousseff announced, once
reelected, the set up of a Constitutional Assembly devoted exclusively to po-
litical reform. In presenting her proposal the President indicated some of the
issues to be addressed by members of Congress, which included discussions
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to put an end to private financing of campaigns, perceived then as one of
the main causes of corruption by politicians. The proposal was subsequently
changed into a national plebiscite, but just as the establishment of a Consti-
tutional Assembly, it was quickly abandoned as the government started to
lose political support in Congress.
Parallel to the political crisis, the second term of President Rousseff co-
incided with a period of steady deterioration the economic situation in the
country. The reasons for the crisis are manifold and still divide analysts,
but there is little doubt that the delayed effects of the 2008 financial crisis
in Brazil and the slowdown of the Chinese economy as of 2012 did play a
critical role. In a context characterized by little economic activity, austerity
measures were introduced in an attempt to curb a monthly 7% inflation in
2015. The level of unemployment rose to 8.5% in that year and the GDP
shrank 3.8%, damaging the popularity of the President even further.
The combination of economic crisis with the revelations from the Lava
Jato investigations had a devastating effect of the popularity of the President.
In 2016, the year Dilma Rousseff left power, only 24% of the population
trusted her and merely 10% considered her government good or excellent,
according to a survey carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Public Poll
and Statistics (CNI-IBOPE, 2016), displayed in graph 2.1.
The parties that belonged to the Government coalition during the second
term of President Rousseff represented 289 seats or 56% of the total number
of congressmen, a support wide enough to approve any legislation presented
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by the Executive. That fact notwithstanding, Dilma collected a sequence of
significant defeats in Congress during her second term. The defeats included
issues of utmost importance to the Executive. Headed by the President
of the Lower House, Eduardo Cunha - a powerful enemy and former ally
of the President-, politicians raised the limit for compulsory retirement for
members of the Judiciary from 70 to 75 years old, thus preventing Dilma
from nominating a new justice to the Supreme Court, as she intended to do.
Other defeats included the creation by Congress of a special commission
to investigate the Brazilian state oil enterprise, Petrobras, and the reduction
of the age of criminal responsibility. This “revolt” of members of the gov-
ernment coalition was initiated by delays by the Executive in the concession
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of funds for “pork-barrel”, but was later fueled by the President’s increasing
declining approval ratings and her inability to deal with Congress. As rates
fell amidst the flow of revelations from the Lava Jato investigations, con-
gressmen preferred to distance themselves from an increasingly unpopular
President threatened by investigations of corruption, showing little or no in-
terest in supporting bills presented by the Executive. The process culminated
in the acceptance of the process of impeachment against Dilma Rousseff in
2015, when many members of her own coalition voted against her.5
During Dilma Roussef’s second term, some regular patterns of interac-
tion between the Executive and the Legislative that had been observed for
decades ceased to work. One of these patterns refers to the rate of success of
the Executive in approving bills it presented to the Legislative. Dilma’s pre-
decessors have counted upon a strong coalition that enabled them to approve
legislation sponsored by the President’s office. Under Dilma the Presidency
remained very active when it comes to presenting bills for consideration by
Congress, but the rate of success in having these bills approved decreased
dramatically (table 2.4).
5Actually the only party from the coalition whose representatives voted unanimously
with the Government and the Workers’ Party against the admission of the impeachment
was the PC do B (Communist Party of Brazil). The impeachment process was approved
in the Lower House with 367 votes, 184 of which from politicians belonging to parties from
the Government coalition: PP (38), PSD (29), PR (26), PMDB (59), PROS (4), PDT (6)
and PRB (22).
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Table 2.4: Proposals approved in Congress by term, 1995-2016
total presidency approved presidency success rate
FHC (1995-98) 816 808 743 0.92
FHC (1999-02) 914 936 814 0.87
Lula (2003-06) 810 759 668 0.88
Lula (2007-10) 942 747 635 0.85
Dilma (2011-14) 710 440 317 0.72
Dilma (2015-16) 213 166 103 0.62
The table displays in the first column the total number of laws approved (ordinary and supplementary
legislation) by presidential term; the second shows the number of proposed bills by the Executive. The
third column shows how many of the proposed bills by the Executive were actually approved by Congress.
The last column shows the percentage of success of the Executive in getting approved the bills it presented
to Congress.
Source: Pereira, Celina (2017), Presidência da República and Congresso Nacional, official websites.
Along the same lines, under Dilma there was an increase in the exercise
of the veto powers of the President. Although the number of vetoes did not
change dramatically in absolute terms from its predecessors, there is a sharp
increase when one looks at the proportion of the legislation approved by
Congress that was subject to presidential veto, especially during the second
term. Moreover, at the height of the crisis, during her last term - only one
year, four months and 13 days as President -, there was a sharp increase in
the absolute number of vetoes (Table 2.5).
33
Table 2.5: Presidential vetoes by term, 1995-2016
laws approved vetoes ratio
FHC (2000-02) 699 134 17.40
Lula (2003-06) 810 150 18.51
Lula (2007-10) 942 201 21.33
Dilma (2011-14) 710 168 23.66
Dilma (2015-16) 213 80 37.55
The table displays in the first column the total number of laws approved
by Congress per term (ordinary laws and supplementary legislation).
The second column indicates the amount of laws that were vetoed in
its entirety or had some of its dispositions vetoed by the President in
each term. The third column displays the ratio of vetoes in relation to
the total amount of laws approved by term. Unfortunately, the site of
Congress did not display any information prior to the year 2000 and it
was not possible to obtain this information from other sources.
Source: Pereira, Celina (2017), Congresso Nacional.
Finally, during Dilma’s second term, the capacity of the President’s office
to get Congress to approve provisional measures enacted by the President
decreased dramatically (table 2.6).
Table 2.6: Provisional Measures by term, 1995-2016
presented rejected or changed % total
FHC (1995-98) 1253 134 10.69
FHC (1999-02) 796 118 14.80
Lula (2003-06) 236 66 28.03
Lula (2007-10) 175 74 42.22
Dilma (2011-14) 140 76 54.48
Dilma (2015-16) 47 39 83.05
The table displays in the first column the total number of provisional measures edited
by each President, by term, from 1995 to 2016. The second column indicates the
amount of provisional measures that were either rejected (not voted or vetoed in its
entirety) or partially changed by Congress. The third column displays the percentage
of provisional measures rejected or changed by Congress in relation to the total amount
edited by the President.
Source: Pereira, Celina (2017), Congresso Nacional.
In what concerns campaign financing, there was an unsteady balance be-
tween actors who opposed and those who favored corporate donations. In
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the years before the landmark decision by the Supreme Court, the Govern-
ment, the Workers’ Party and other left-wing parties attempted to push draft
bills on public financing of campaigns on at least three occasions: 2005, 2009
and 2011. These actors enjoyed the support of the Brazilian Bar Associa-
tion (OAB) and a number of NGOs, which presented their own version of a
draft-bill to Congress. None of these bills ever reached the floor, having met
with strong opposition by politicians favorable to private financing led by
the President of the Lower House, Eduardo Cunha. Cunha and his support-
ers would in response make their own attempts at approving legislation that
favored donations by firms, sponsoring counter-proposals in Congress while
the Supreme Court was still analyzing the issue, as will be explained in more
detail below.
The second term of President Dilma Rousseff took place during a period
of crisis in which relations between the Executive and Legislative became
increasingly tense. The effects of the political crisis were exacerbated by
the economic problems in the economy. As Dilma’s support in Congress
vanished, groups in favor and against corporate donations acted at various
stages to determine the outcomes of interest and attempted to “lock in” one
specific end result favorable to them. The balance between these groups was
unstable and each side could prevail by a slim margin, depending on the
contingency of how the events unfolded.
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2.3.3 The Judiciary
The Judiciary is another important actor whose role was crucial to arrive
at the elimination of corporate donations. Despite the fact that they only
act when called upon, courts do have an important effect on policy, since
legal rules are rarely neutral. Over the years, as Brazil completed its transi-
tion to market economy and democracy, courts at all levels helped defining
alternatives to policy makers, legitimizing or de-legitimizing certain policy
choices. This is especially true in the case of the Brazilian Supreme Court
(Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF), the national constitutional court on which
policy actors increasingly relied to address public policy questions and polit-
ical controversies, in a process analysts have defined as the judicialization of
politics.
The reasons for this active role of courts are manifold and may vary from
case to case, but the literature highlights clearly that it is generally the prod-
uct of a dysfunctional political system. The more deadlocked the political
system becomes, the more likely courts will exert an expansive judicial power
(Guarnieri et al 2002). Greater fragmentation of power among political ac-
tors increases the likelihood of courts asserting themselves (Ferejohn 2002).
In order words, the study of the involvement of the Judiciary in policy debate
cannot be done in isolation, and has to be undertaken parallel to the study
of strategies of other relevant political actors (Taylor, 2008).
According to Hischl (2011), the judicialization of politics is a widespread
phenomena of late twentieth, early twenty-first-centuries. Over the last
36
decades, some of the most pertinent and polemical controversies have been
transferred to courts in many countries. This was the case, for instance,
of the American presidential election of 2000; the outcome of the Mexican
election in 2006; the war in Chechnya; the Pervez Musharaff coup in Pak-
istan; Germany’s place in the EU; as well as restorative justice issues in Latin
America, eastern Europe and South Africa (Hirschl 2011). The judicializa-
tion of politics is also evident in the increasing oversight of electoral processes
by courts. Courts have been asked to decide on questions like party funding;
campaign financing; broadcast advertising during election campaigns; and
the approval or disqualification of parties and candidates (Miller 2004).
In Brazil, since the end of military rule in 1985, the Supreme Court has
played an important role as the final arbiter of controversies crucial to society
and the state. For the first two decades after the reinstatement of civilian
rule, the Supreme Court displayed a pattern of accommodation in interbranch
relations, rarely confronting the other branches of government, in particular
with regards to the economic policies implemented by successive Presidents
(Kapiszewski, 2012).
While in the first years after democratization the Supreme Court dis-
played an often accommodating behavior when ruling, in later years the
Court took an increasingly active and defying position on issues of political
relevance. The importance of a number of issues over which it became polit-
ically difficult to achieve super-majority support and the fact that the 1988
Constitution had conferred ample powers to the STF put the court at the
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center of public policy debate. This interpretation was confirmed to me by
one former magistrate of the court (Justice Nelson Jobim), who chaired the
STF in 2004: “After the 1988 Constitution, the role of the Supreme Court
changed dramatically and the court stopped holding positions so close to the
Executive. One of the reasons for this is that the 1988 Constitution gave
a number of actors - parties, the Federal Bar Association (OAB/DF), labor
unions and other public agents - the possibility of petitioning directly to
the court and questioning the constitutionality of laws and regulations. This
was not possible during the military rule. The 1988 Constitution opened thus
new possibilities for a number of actors and I believe some of the petitioners
used this new possibility less for the purpose of the law than to attract public
attention and attain political gains”(Jobim, 2020).
Justice Jobim also alluded to the increasing loss of power by party lead-
erships in Congress and how this process made it more difficult to reach
consensus on new legislation, almost as if each legislator held not the party’s
position, but his or her own individual stance on certain issues. This became
a strong incentive to look to the Supreme Court in search for a decision on
sensitive topics: “in 2005 there was a serious dispute between the Workers’
Party (PT) and the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) for the chairmanship
of Congress, but none of the candidates from these parties won enough votes
to be elected. The election was won by one of the so-called ‘backbenchers’,
Mr. Severino Cavalcanti, who inaugurated a new way of doing politics in
the House. Severino established a direct link with individual congressmen,
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ignoring the party leaderships altogether. When some intrincate negotiation
was needed to approve new legislation, this was done directly between the
Chair and the congressman himself. After Severino left, this way of doing
things was preserved by the following chairmen. The lack of institutional
mechanisms to deal with different positions and the weakening of party lead-
erships worked as a stimulus to petition to the Supreme Court for a decision.”
(Jobim, 2020).
My interviewee also attributed the more assertive role played by the
Supreme Court on issues of political relevance to the Justices themselves.
In Brazil, nominations to the STF are made by the President according to
certain constitutional rules. Traditionally, the nominees are lawyers, mag-
istrates or attorneys of highly recognized expertise, but according to Jobim
President Lula started to subvert this norm and favor candidates linked to
him and his party, but not necessarily widely recognized as experts by their
peers (Dias Toffoli, one of the current magistrates of the court, had been
lawyer of the Workers’ Party and of Lula himself in previous presidential
campaigns. He was not a “recognized expert” in any legal branch and had
failed twice the public entrance exams for magistrate). As a consequence,
many of the Justices appointed as of 2003 felt - according to my interviewee
- the need to build a strong reputation as jurists while in the Court, some-
thing that before 2003 was seen as a precondition to be nominated. They did
so either by showing their independence and vigorously rejecting petitions
from the Executive or by assuming new, unorthodox legal positions to show
39
their originality as experts. According to Jobim, this “personal” need of the
Justices also contributed to the more active role of the STF (Jobim, 2020).
In any case, what I am suggesting is not that the magistrates from the
Supreme Court voluntarily decided to replace Congress as the institution
responsible for law making. The actual process was much more intricate
and subtle, involving the confluence of a number of simultaneous elements.
In my reading of it and on the basis of the interviews carried out, certain
questions of direct political relevance were directed to the STF in view of the
more salient role the court had acquired over the years and because action by
parliament on them looked distant. This happened at a time when a tendency
of enlargement of the role played by the Judiciary, backed by a progressive
view of the organ shared by some magistrates, was visible worldwide.
During the Presidency of Dilma Rousseff, the political crisis originated
by the government’s loss of support in Congress and the inherent difficulty
in finding politically viable solutions to some key and sensitive issues cre-
ated a situation in which political actors increasingly looked to the Supreme
Court for decisions. The judicialization of politics, although visible since
the 90s, became particularly clear in those years. The Supreme Court ruled
on a number of issues over which Congress was unable to legislate. This
progressive judicialization of politics was not the consequence of conserva-
tive magistrates ruling to soften aspects of progressive legislation introduced
by the other branches of government, but was rather a manifestation of a
more general tendency of modern democracies, where the Judiciary assumes
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a proactive role in view of the incapacity of other branches of Government to
solve crucial political issues (Hirschl 2011).6 In many instances, the Supreme
Court took a stance that was far more progressive than the position many
congressmen would have supported.
Among the political issues that were in the public eye and were referred
to the Supreme Court were the recognition of same sex marriage (for which
there was no specific legislation); the unconstitutionality of the establishment
of an “electoral threshold” for parties; the prohibition of citizens condemned
in second instance by a panel of magistrates to run for public office (Lei
da Ficha Limpa or Clean Record Act); the permission of abortion in case
of an anencephalic fetus; the establishment of criteria for the creation of
Indian reservations; and the ban on corporate donations as a means to finance
political campaigns.
It is not surprising, in view of recent activity by the Supreme Court, that
the Federal Bar Association (OAB) - one of Brazilian civil society represen-
tatives that had been active in the defense of public financing of campaigns
- decided to bring the issue of corporate donations to its attention.
6Actually most magistrates in the Supreme Court had been appointed by Dilma Roussef
or by her predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Only three out of eleven magistrates
had been appointed by previous, right-wing oriented governments: Justice Marco Aurelio
Mello, appointed by President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990/92); Celso de Mello, ap-
pointed during the Presidency of José Sarney (1985/90) and Gilmar Mendes, appointed
by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995/2003)
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2.3.4 The OAB and the ruling by the Supreme Court
The 1988 Constitution established several legal instruments for constitutional
review at the Supreme Court. For our purposes, the most relevant is the
so called Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, ADIN (Direct Injunction of
Unconstitutionality), which is a legal instrument allowing select political ac-
tors to challenge the constitutionality of a federal or state law directly at
the Supreme Court. The list of actors empowered to bring ADINs to the
Supreme Court include the President, the leadership of the Senate, the lead-
ership of the Chamber of Deputies, state governors, the prosecutor-general,
the Federal Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, OAB), polit-
ical parties with congressional representation and national unions. ADINs
allow the entitled actors listed to challenge federal laws that have been passed
by the executive branch, by Congress and by other courts. Their decisions
(effects) are binding and cannot be appealed.
Throughout the transition to democracy and after, the OAB played a
prominent role in Brazilian history. After a brief period in which the as-
sociation lent support to the military regime, the OAB engaged in public
opposition and became a powerful voice in structuring the military’s exit
from power and the transition that followed. Since the 1970s, the association
became civil society’s spokesperson for a number of issues, including the rule
of law, human rights and citizenship. Under civilian rule, the OAB fought
corruption during the Collor Presidency, pushing for thorough investigations
of the President’s campaign finance director. During the Cardoso era, the
42
association opposed “neoliberal” reforms and during Lula’s time it publicly
condemned both politicians involvement in corruption scandals and what it
considered to be breaches of individual rights due to alleged excesses of public
investigators.
The OAB was one of the actors entitled by the Constitution to file an
ADIN at the Supreme Court. In view with of its experience with this legal
mechanism over the years - according to Taylor (2008), the OAB was respon-
sible for filing 5% of all ADINs from 1988 to 2002; its rate of success was
higher that that of other actors entitled -, it comes as no surprise that the as-
sociation decided to take the issue of corporate financing to the court. During
the Lula and Dilmas years, the association had on many occasions publicly
voiced its position against the financing of political campaigns through pri-
vate corporations’ money. Even if there was no assurance about the exact
content of a prospective decision by the STF, such a decision would be a
legislative innovation and would put an end to discussions about financing
legislation in Parliament.
The ADIN petition that challenged the constitutionality of campaign do-
nations was filed at the Supreme Court in Setember 2011, the same year a
member of the Workers’ Party presented the party’s own proposal of politi-
cal reform - which banned corporate donations - to a special commission of
political reform in Congress and which dragged on for years without being
put to a vote. The petition challenged certain provisions of law 9.504/97 (Lei
Eleitoral or Electoral Law) and law 9.096/95 (Lei dos Partidos Poĺiticos or
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Law of the Political Parties). The petition had three separate requests: (1)
the declaration of unconstitutionality with immediate effect of the corporate
donations as a means to finance campaigns; (2) the declaration of unconsti-
tutionality after 24 months of the existing caps on donations by individuals
and self financing by candidates (10% of the gross income from the year pre-
vious to the election); (3) the request for Congress to enact within 24 months
legislation that fixed the mentioned caps at lower levels.
The fact that the Executive did not have enough support to approve the
reform and that Congress was unlikely to approve changes in the finance
regime that went against interest of many of its members - regardless of
how much these changes were desired by the Brazilian society - were key
considerations for the OAB confirmed by practically all interviewees. One
of the authors of the original petition, a Brazilian lawyer, when asked about
the reasons that led the OAB/DF to file at that precise moment the bill
questioning the constitutionality of corporate donations to politicians and
parties, said that “that was the only way, as Congress would never have
approved the reform we wanted”.
Another key consideration was the role of the Supreme Court as arbiter
of political disputes. This same interviewee stated that he and his colleagues
were convinced of the legitimacy of the court to rule on the issue of corpo-
rate donations and rejected adamantly that any decision would be a case of
the STF extrapolating its constitutional role: “This is a criticism - judicial
activism - that is often voiced by political scientists. However, we were con-
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vinced that by any angle you looked into the question, it was legitimate that
the Supreme Court examined the issue of corporate financing (Souza Neto,
2019)”.
Taking the words of the signatory of the ADIN into the broader con-
text outlined above, it seems reasonable that the reform was the product of
a number of separate contingent factors coming together in 2011: (1) the
incapacity of the Executive - aggravated by the “bad blood” between the
President and the Legislative - to gather support to approve a reform that
went against the interests of many politicians; (2) the enlarged role played
by the STF in the last few years, which made the court more receptive to
accept injunctions on the constitutionality of issues of broader political im-
pact, like financial regulations of elections; (3) the political salience of the
campaign financing issue, which resonated with the interests and positions
of societal actors like the OAB and ultimately led it to file the injunction
at the STF. Was it possible that the OAB or another legally entitled actor
could have brought the same issue to the court at a different point in time?
It certainly was, but during the Presidencies of FHC and Lula, when the
Congress was operational, the Court exerted a much more restrained role as
far as its willingness to get involved in political issues went.
One of the Supreme Court justices interviewed for this paper confirmed
this new ethos of the Court. Fully aware of the criticisms of excessive judi-
cial intervention in questions belonging to the Executive and the Legislative,
he stated that the Supreme Court should not act pro-actively in legislat-
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ing except in two exceptional circumstances related to (a) the protection of
democracy and (b) the protection of fundamental individual rights enshrined
in the Constitution. When commenting specifically on the injunction on cor-
porate donations, this magistrate argued that the issue was primarily related
to the protection of democracy, of whether the current financing model of
campaigns could be considered compatible with the idea of democracy en-
shrined in the Brazilian constitution. The current system allowed firms to
contribute to competing candidates regardless of their positions. He argued
that this situation was dangerous to democracy, as it allowed firms - which,
unlike citizens, are not holders of political rights like suffrage - to develop
ties with politicians in anticipation of favors, as the abundant evidence of
corruption involving firms and candidates had already showed. By enabling
this kind of relation, the financial rules had become a threat to democracy
itself, as some actors exerted disproportionate influence on Government due
to the fact that they had contributed lavishly to the campaigns of winning
candidates (Barroso 2019).
In his own vote for the ADIN 4650, this same magistrate offered additional
comments on the prevailing position about the role of the court: “it is a
representation role, it is the role of interpreting and attempting to make a
reality of certain wishes of society which are paralyzed within the majority
rule. The majority rule, which takes place in Congress, often faces deadlocks,
faces hurdles in achieving consensus; this is not only in Brazil, it is all over
the world. (...) It (the role of the court) is to make history go forward when
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it has come to a halt”7.
Another interviewee, one of the signatories of the original petition who
was President of the OAB at the time, when asked about the reasons that
prompted the association to file the injunction at that precise moment, ini-
tially rejected that the composition of the Supreme Court had been a pre-
ponderant factor in the decision. He insisted that the injunction was filed
as soon as the OAB became convinced of the soundness of the legal argu-
ments it would bring to the judges about the unconstitutionality of corporate
donations in view of the text of the 1988 Constitution.
This same interviewee recognized, however, that he and the other signa-
tories were fully aware of the enlarged role the STF had been playing in the
last few years and shared the opinion that this was something very positive,
as it represented a progressive tendency of the court. According to him,
the OAB welcomed what he defined as a “new vision” of the STF, where
magistrates were more committed not only to defend the prerogatives of the
State, but also the rights of citizens, meaning by that recent decisions of the
court with a clear impact on individual rights, like the recognition of same
sex marriage, the constitutionality of quotas for blacks in public universities
7Mas existe uma outra competência que Cortes Constitucionais desempenham - e que,
no caso brasileiro, se tornou importante em muitas situações - que, ao lado da função
contramajoritária, é uma função representativa, é a função de interpretar e procurar con-
cretizar determinados anseios da sociedade que estão paralisados no processo poĺıtico ma-
joritário. Porque o processo poĺıtico majoritário, que é o que se desenrola no Congresso,
muitas vezes, encontra impasses, encontra dificuldades de produção de consenso; não é
só no Brasil, é no mundo inteiro.(...)É para fazer andar a história, quando ela tenha
parado. The full content of the vote can be found in the website of Justice Barroso,
www.luisrobertobarroso.com.br/votos-e-decisoes
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and in the public service and the defense of right to vote in an electoral sys-
tem not distorted by the undue influence of corporate money. Commenting
on the positive response of the Court to the injunction he filed, he added
that the such a response would most probably not have been issued years
earlier (Cavalcante, 2019), a point that was also expressed by another inter-
viewee, who explained this by contrasting the more progressive composition
of the Court in the 2000s with the conservative composition immediately
after democratization (Lima 2020).
The other interviewee mentioned above who also drafted the injunction
confirmed that the stalemate in Congress was key to the initiative by the
Bar Association and that a positive ruling was expected, although it was
uncertain whether the court would accept all requests by the authors: “This
was an issue - banning corporate donnations- which Congress was not ready to
address. That was one of the points considered. We believed that a positive
ruling by the Supreme Court was feasible as the congressional channels were
obstructed (...) There was some margin of doubt whether the Supreme Court
would agree with the requests in its entirety. In the end, we believe that the
decision still allowed too much room for self-financing, thus favoring rich
candidates (Souza Neto, 2019)”.8
My reading of these interviews is that the change of legislation concerning
the financing of elections was not the result of a cumulative process of years of
8The final ruling did not accept the request of the petitioners to declare unconstitutional
the caps on self-financing and donations by individuals
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negotiation among relevant stakeholders. It was a turning point in relatively
exceptional circumstances, as cases of critical junctures should be. This
change became possible due to the initiative of a professional union whose
members trusted that members of the STF shared their opinion about the
need to reform financial electoral rules and believed that magistrates would
accept the legal arguments to back such changes. The representatives of the
OAB knew that there would be municipal elections in the short term, in 2012,
and that a favorable decision could be soon put to test. They also knew -
even if they could not say it as bluntly as I interpret their words - that any
attempt to go to court and lock in a favorable result had to be tried at that
moment, in 2011, when the chances were higher that the STF would accept
their arguments than before. They also knew that the regular legislative
path was blocked and there was no expectation that it would unblock soon.
In a session that started in 2013 and ended in 2015, the Brazilian Supreme
Court ruled unconstitutional corporate financing of campaigns by 8 votes in
favor and 3 against it. From the 8 justices that ruled in favor of the banning,
4 were appointed by President Lula (Dias Toffoli, Ricardo Lewandowski,
Cármem Lúcia and Joaquim Barbosa); 2 by President Dilma (Rosa Weber
and Luis Roberto Barroso); 1 by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Luiz
Fux) and 1 by President Fernando Collor de Mello (Marco Aurelio Mello).
From those 3 that voted against, 1 had been appointed by Dilma, 1 by Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso and 1 by José Sarney. The court also rejected any
change in the existing rules for contributions by individuals and by candi-
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dates to their own campaigns.
The progressive view that magistrates had of their own role at the Supreme
Court was an important element to understand how they were able to rule
against the interest of politicians. From the content of their votes and the
interviews carried out, it is clear to me that the majority of magistrates was
convinced not only of the soundness of judicial argumentation against the
constitutionality of corporate donations, but also of the positive effects of
that decision for the future of the Brazilian democracy.
Moreover, we know that courts - especially high courts - do not take de-
cisions completely isolated from public opinion, even if Brazilian magistrates
often keep sustaining that their positions are taken exclusively on the basis of
legal arguments. A vast literature explores an empirical association between
public opinion and judicial decisions and political scientists still discuss to
what extent and when exactly courts’ output responds to the public’s pref-
erence (Giles, Blackstone, and Vining 2008; Norpoth and Segal 1994; Segal
and Spaeth 2002). At the same time, citizens routinely evaluates justices and
this evaluation is sensitive to what happens in the political and social land-
scape. Magistrates do take into consideration the degree of public support
when ruling, even if their decisions are not limited to merely reflect what
the public wants. A judicial opposition to Congress can, for instance, lead
to resentment and loss of trust among the general public if it is perceived as
causing unbalance in the constitutional system (Caldeira, 1986). When they
go against Congress, magistrates have to be specially aware of the factors
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pro and against their ruling.
In the specific case of this decision, the vast majority of Brazilians -
conscious of the revelations brought about by prosecutors in the Car Wash
investigations - was openly against the possibility of firms funding politicians
and parties. In an opinion poll carried out a few months before the final
ruling by the court and widely reported by the media, 74% of participants
declared themselves against the corporate financing of politicians and parties
and 79% stated their belief that corporate donations was a powerful stimulus
to corruption among politicians.9
Thus, in addition to the reasons already indicated, the degree of pub-
lic support was another relevant factor in fully grasping why and how the
majority of justices in the Brazilian Supreme Court took such a firm stance
against a means of financing that was vital to most politicians. Magistrates
not only were convinced that this was the right decision to take, but they
had a strong support from NGOs, activists, left-wing politicians10 in favor
of public financing of campaigns and, most importantly, from the public in
general.
9Maioria é contra a doação de empresas a campanhas politicas, diz DATAFOLHA
(Majority is against the corporate financing of political campaigns, says DATAFOLHA).
Article published in the newspaper Folha de São Paulo in 07/06/2015. The news and the
results of the opinion poll were widely reported by other newspapers and chanel TVs.
10As described in the following section, not all politicians in Congress were prepared
to openly declare themselves in favor corporate donations at this time. While left-wing
politicians traditionally favored the public funding of campaigns, it is probable that others
were afraid of publicly challenging the court’s decision, prefering to stay neutral or express
themselves contrary to corporate financing even if they had benefitted from it in the past.
51
2.4 The Legacy
One of the main features of a critical juncture is the establishment of an en-
during legacy, as one of the possible outcomes of a political process becomes
locked in in the course of events. In the case of the Supreme Court ruling, the
impossibility of politicians to finance their campaigns trough corporate dona-
tions became the norm as soon the the ruling was published, being applicable
for the first time in the 2016 elections for mayors and city councils. The new
norm has remained unchanged in the aftermath, having been observed also
in the general Brazilian elections of 2018.
Yet one of the key questions concerns the counterfactual of what could
have gone differently. After all, there were attempts to prevail by each of the
actors involved and more than one alternative for change were available. As it
is expected in a critical juncture situation, the final result of the process was
not predetermined from the start, as contingent elements strongly influenced
the unfolding of events.11 A careful examination of the sequence of events
indicates how much could have happened differently.
The opportunity for a different course of events to unfold happened while
the petition by the Federal Bar Association was still being examined by the
Supreme Court. Although the case stayed in court for 2 years, proceedings
11Actually, two of the signatories of the petition from the Brazilian Bar Association
expressed that at a certain point the “end result” was on the brink of being exactly the
opposite, that is, the complete legalization of corporate donations, as it will be seen in the
following paragraphs on the maneuvers played by the President of the Assembly and his
supporters. Confronted with the decision of the Court, they expected Congress to succeed
in undoing the ruling and approving new legislation in favor of corporate donations.
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were interrupted twice. The first time the interruption was when Justice
Teori Zavaski asked to examine the files more thoroughly. Justice Zavaski
returned the case for trial after a few months and while the final ruling was
still undecided.
The second time the procedures were interrupted was when Justice Gilmar
Mendes too requested time to examine the case more closely. At that point
in time - April 2015 - the ruling was already defined and the majority of
the justices had already declared themselves for the unconstitutionality of
corporate donations. Nevertheless, the suspension - which this time lasted
much longer - gave the opponents of the decision an opportunity to act. Jus-
tice Mendes did not express his views at that point, but he was known for
favoring the possibility of corporate donations.
Justice Mendes was harshly criticized by NGOs and politicians for sus-
pending the procedures in the Supreme Court, as the unconstitutionality
of corporate donations had already been agreed to by the majority of the
court. Protests took place in a number of occasions under the slogan De-
volve Gilmar (“Give it back, Gilmar”), urging the magistrate to return the
files of the case and allow it to conclude. Justice Mendes ignored the pleas
and kept the judgment suspended for 1 year and 5 months, extrapolating the
deadlines imposed by the court regulations, which limit the suspension time
in situations like this to a maximum of two months. In an interview given
by the time he finally referred the case back to judgment, Justice Mendes
stated that the reason for suspending the judgment was to “allow the debate
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on campaign financing to mature, including in view of the revelations of the
Car Wash investigations” (Mendes, G. 2015).
When I interviewed him in the preparation for this paper, Justice Mendes
confirmed that in his opinion the Court was heading towards a bad decision if
it ruled positively towards the OAB-DF. Less concerned with legal reasoning
than with the the political context and the electoral rules according to which
campaigns are carried out, he firstly alluded to the fact that the way parties
managed public funds for legislative elections often gave some candidates -
incumbents in good terms with the party leadership - a substantial advantage
towards their peers. Corporate donations offered challengers and newcomers
a real and legal means to stand up to officeholders in the electoral arena. The
Court was, thus, on the way to strip aspirant politicians of this important
resource (Mendes, G. 2020).
In this same interview Justice Mendes stated his belief that banning cor-
porate donations would - contrary to what he considered to be the naive
expectations of the other magistrates - actually stimulate unlawful donations
and corruption: “imagine the common situation where a businessmen wants
to donate to one or even to multiple candidates. Using his company this busi-
nessman is able to donate in a lawful and transparent way. The moment this
possibility no longer exist, the only possibility for this gentleman to donate
legally is to do so as an individual. But he might not feel comfortable to do
this because he is a public person and might not want the general public to
be aware to whose campaign he is contributing to. Once you forbid the use
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of corporations, contributors like this hypothetical businessman might start
considering that it is in their best interest to make off the books donations,
since donating as private citizens could harm their public image. I believe
this can have detrimental effects to our electoral process. When I suspended
the procedures of the action of unconstitutionality against corporate dona-
tions I expected that the revelations of the Car Wash investigations would
make politicians and my colleagues aware of this risk.” (Mendes, G. 2020).
In any case, the fact of the matter is, however, that while proceedings
in court were suspended in 2015, politicians in favor of corporate financing
gathered around the then President of the Assembly, Eduardo Cunha, and
created a united coalition in an attempt to legalize it unequivocally.12 Cunha
and his group worked simultaneously in two different fronts: on the one hand,
they sponsored a draft bill changing a number of aspects of the electoral law
and legalizing corporate donations to politicians and parties. The bill, if
approved, would have the status of a federal law. Its potential validity was
uncertain in view of the pending decision by the Supreme Court. On the
other hand, the group led by Cunha sponsored an amendment proposal to
the Brazilian Constitution. Although much harder to pass due to the stricter
procedure applicable, which required 3/5 of the total votes in the Lower
House (308 votes) and in the Upper House (49 votes), the constitutional
12One of the Supreme Court justices interviewed expressed the opinion that in suspend-
ing the proceedings of the case, Justice Mendes was deliberately giving the opponents
of the ruling in Congress a clear cue to act and approve legislation running against the
decision already taken by the majority of the magistrates (Barroso, 2019).
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amendment, if approved, would overrun any decision by the Supreme Court
in the opposite sense concerning the current constitutional text.
Cunha - a corrupt politician and a true expert in legislative procedures -
used all available tactics and procedures to make both the bill and the con-
stitutional amendment advance fast while the final decision by the Supreme
Court was pending. Had he prevailed - he almost did - the legislative reform
would have taken a different form.
The draft bill proceeded fast in a number of house commissions and
reached the floor in September 2015, being approved by the Lower House.
To become effective, it needed though to be sanctioned by President Dilma
Rousseff, who was against it.
At this point in time - September 2015 -, Justice Gilmar Mendes had
finally referred the suspended case back to the Supreme Court, which then
issued its final decision (8 votes in favor, 3 against), stating clearly that
donations by firms to political campaigns violated the Brazilian Constitution.
Using the decision issued a few days before by the Supreme Court to support
her decision, President Rousseff exercised her veto power and struck down the
specific provisions of the draft law that allowed firms to donate to parties.
The Brazilian Congress could still overturn the veto of the President, but
Cunha and his supporters were unable to get enough votes to do it.
But that was still not the end of it. Although the draft bill had been
definitely rejected, there was still the constitutional amendment to be ana-
lyzed. Cunha had decided to put the proposal to vote in May 2015, before
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the Supreme Court resumed its trial. Initially, Cunha and his supporters
managed to gather 264 votes in favor of making corporate donations consti-
tutional, falling short of the 308 votes necessary to approve the constitutional
change. The issue was not settled though, as Cunha played with the internal
regulations of the Lower House and managed to put the issue to vote once
again the following day. The difference was that while the original text of
the amendment enabled firms to donate directly to candidates, the slightly
modified version he put to vote the following day required that donations be
directed to parties, which would be in charge of distributing the amounts to
candidates in accordance with their regulations and priorities.
This time the maneuver worked out and the proposal to amend the consti-
tution was approved by 330 votes, 22 votes more than the necessary. Worried
with the impending legalization of corporate donations, more than 60 Con-
gressmen rushed to the Supreme Court and filed an injunction to invalidate
the proceedings in Congress, but the Court failed to find any reason to do
it. The amendment had still to be approved in the Upper House, where both
sides were fighting fiercely. After hours of intense debate, the constitutional
amendment was rejected in the Upper House by just 5 votes, with 36 votes
against and 31 votes in favor of it. With the rejection of the constitutional
amendment and the issuance of the final ruling by the Supreme Court, the
possibility of firms donating money to candidates or to parties was definitely
rejected in Brazil. Despite the attempts by Congress and an almost turning
of the events, the ruling of the Supreme Court was not overthrown and the
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new financial regime was fixed for the upcoming elections.
The sequence events described above points to the more immediate el-
ements as to how Congress was unable to reinstate corporate donations,
despite coming close to doing it. From a more theoretical point of view,
overriding a Supreme Court decision is a relatively rare event and the exact
situations in which overrides take place are not always clear (Hettinger and
Zorn, 2000). Despite the obvious dependence of many politicians on cor-
porate donations, reinstating them would have meant for reelection seeking
actors to go against voter’s best judgment. A few months before the ruling
by the STF, an opinion poll carried out in the Lower House in which 88%
of federal deputies participated, 40.3% stated to be in favor of corporate do-
nations, practically the same percentage of those who said to be against it,
which was 40.1%. The latter also said that they were in favor of mechanisms
to effectively enforce the prohibition to parties and politicians (Doação de
empresas para campanhas divide deputados, 2015).13 If politicians needed
funds for campaigns, it seemed easier at this point to accomodate to the new
situation created by the court’s ruling and search for alternative ways to raise
funds, as I indicate in the conclusion.
13Doação de empresas para campanhas divide deputados (Corporate donations to




During the Presidency of Dilma Rousseff Brazil experienced a phase of po-
litical uncertainty in which long delayed campaign finance reform was finally
implemented by a decision of the Supreme Court after a successful injunction
filed by the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB/DF). In the argument presented,
institutional change happened somewhat abruptly, in a process classified as
an example of what the literature defines as a “critical juncture”. Change
was the product of the interaction of structural and contingent factors within
a specific historical context.
Under unusual exceptional circumstances (the more active role of the
Supreme Court; the resistance of Congress to reach a definite decision on
the issue of campaign financing; the difficulty of the Executive to approve
legislation on it), actors not institutionally in charge of law making came to
the foreground of the political process. These actors set in motion a process
of change and managed to lock in an end result more favorable to them.
The final outcome of the change process (the ban on corporate donations),
although influenced by the preferences of some key actors, was not a mere
reflection of them. The Supreme Court could have either accepted or rejected
in full the petition of the Bar. It granted it only in part and in a split vote.
The original petition also asked for the establishment of a cap on donations
by individuals, a request that, had it been granted, would have constituted
a different result among the set of possible results that defines a critical
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juncture while the final outcome has not yet been fixed. The enlarged role
of the Court and the sense of mission of its judges, combined with the public
support for the decision help understand why the STF did not shy from
ruling against the interest of politicians.
After the decision by the Court, Congress ran to approve legislation that
reinstated corporate donations, but the new provision was subsequently ve-
toed by the President (case of the bill sponsored by Cunha´s supporters) or
not approved in the Upper House (case of the constitutional amendment).
Had Congress prevailed - it almost did, as we have shown - the end result
would have been different. This is to say, briefly, that during the phase of
critical juncture there was a certain degree of indeterminacy and which only
came to an end sometime after the Court reached its final decision.
One question to which it is worth coming back at this point refers to the
legacy of this critical juncture episode, to the issue of whether we can state,
with some degree of confidence, that the unusual circumstances leading to
the banning of corporate donations in Brazil have disappeared, leaving a
situation of relative stability as to the financial rules that will discipline
campaign financing in the upcoming years. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court decision proved to be final so far. In the years after the Supreme Court
released its final ruling, no effort was made by any relevant actor to reinstate
corporate donations in any meaningful way. One way of seeing this is that
politicians might not have found it in their best interest to publicly sponsor
legislation on such a sensitive issue and go against the ruling of the Court,
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especially after the frustrated attempts described earlier.
On the other hand, however, actors seem to have accommodated to the
new situation and found innovative ways to afford expensive campaigns, even
if they could not rely on money received from corporations. After all, al-
though it outlawed one important source of funds for politicians, the Supreme
Court ruling did not touch on the structural characteristics of the electoral
system that created the need for such funds in the first place. Besides, a num-
ber of politicians have defended for years that the system migrate to public
funding. Indeed, in 2017 the Brazilian Congress approved the creation of a
new special fund (the so called Electoral Fund or Fundo Eleitoral) whose sole
aim was to pay for the expenses incurred by parties in subsequent campaigns
(Law 13.487/2017). The sources of the money that constitute the fund are
public, provided by the National Treasury.14 In 2018, the union budget as-
signed 1.7 billion reais to the Electoral Fund - less that the total cost of 4
billion reais of the nationwide legislative elections in 2014, but far more than
the usual amount of public funds allocated for elections. In 2020, the amount
assigned was 2 billion reais, signaling thus that politicians will increasingly
rely on public money to respond to their campaigning needs and that the
window to reinstate corporate donations might have definitely closed.
Marked by public disagreements and heated discussions as it was, the
banning of corporate donations to finance political campaigns represented
14The details of how the funds are to be divided and managed by parties were fixed by
the Supreme Electoral Court in 2018 through a specific resolution on the issue.
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an important change in Brazilian electoral rules. The consequences of this
change are still not fully understood, being open to scrutiny by researchers
and scholars. It is remains to be studied, for instance, whether the banning of
corporate donations became a strong stimulus to donors to donate unlawfully,
as Justice Mendes warned. Be that as it may, in the following chapters I will
attempt to investigate some of the possible effects of this change on the
performance of incumbent politicians vis-a-vis their challengers.
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Chapter 3
Campaigning with Big Money:
the 2008/2012 cycle
3.1 Background
Incumbency advantage is one of the most studied topics in political science,
at least in the US. There is a vast literature about the sources and conse-
quences of incumbency effects. The study of incumbency is based on a few
assumptions, like the desire of incumbents to maximize their probability of
reelection, or the fact that incumbents enjoy a large advantage when running
for the U.S. House of Representatives.
In contrast to the abundant evidence in US elections, the amount of
studies that have examined electoral advantages of incumbents in developing
countries is still relatively small. Contrary to what one could expect, some
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of these studies pointed out that incumbency, instead of being a source of
advantage, is often associated with a negative effect on electoral performance,
at least as far as the candidate’s vote share is considered the outcome of
interest.1
Estimating the effect of incumbency status on electoral performance is
not an easy task. Any positive effect could easily be the result of biased
estimates, as unobserved attributes may be correlated with both being an
incumbent and achieving electoral success (Horiuchi and Leigh, 2009). A
direct application of OLS would, thus, not be the best way to find an estimate
that is close enough to the real effect.
In order to solve this methodological problem, much of the literature has
explored a variety of quasi-natural experiments. This is the case, for instance,
of Levitt (1994) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997), who used information from
pairs of candidates that face each other repeatedly to assess the effects of
incumbency. Other authors like Lee (2008), Linden (2004) and Uppal (2008)
use regression discontinuity designs to tackle the same questions. Finally,
recent studies (Magalhães 2014), while still using a regression discontinuity
design, have pointed out the need to have a measurement of incumbency
advantage that is comparable across countries, which led him to focus on
the effect of incumbency for an individual politician on the unconditional
probability of rerunning and winning.
1This is the case, for example, of Klasnja and Titiunik (2017), Dix (1984) and Molina
(2001), who analyze Latin American cases. For a study with similar findings in India, see
Uppal (2008).
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However, even if the literature has found ways to minimize the influence
of confounding factors on incumbency effects, the question of whether and
how such effects interact with electoral rules remains largely unexplored. In
majority elections the potential effect of incumbency should be relatively
straightforward to observe, as elected candidates occupy executive positions
in government and can more easily be identified by voters as responsible for
public administration. They also have more direct access to resources that
can be used to build a personal reputation through constituency service.
In the case of proportional elections the situation is slightly more complex.
Elected politicians face greater difficulties in building a personal reputation
since claiming credit can be difficult when there are multiple incumbents.
It is not very clear the extent to which voters in proportional systems with
open lists, where the amount of candidates running for a single post can be
large (as is the case in Brazil), are able to overcome information challenges
to link political outcomes to particular incumbents (Dettman, Pepinsky &
Pieskalla, 2017).
In this chapter I propose to investigate incumbency effects with evidence
from Brazilian municipal elections held in 2008 and 2012. Given the litera-
ture gap on the relation between incumbency status and electoral systems, I
use different methodologies to evaluate what kind of insights the data offers
with regards to the effects of incumbency in majority versus proportional
elections. My analysis will be performed on a sample conditional on rerun-
ning for the same post, firstly using a difference-in-difference approach and
65
secondly a regression discontinuity design. An additional investigation, us-
ing a regression discontinuity design without conditioning and employing an
alternative outcome variable (the probability of rerunning and winning), is
to be found in the appendix, as explained below.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I will present a brief
description of previous literature on incumbency advantage in the U.S. and
in Brazil. In the following section I address the gaps in the literature that
this paper intends to fill and present my basic hypotheses. In section 3.4 my
basic models are presented and in section 3.5 I discuss the data. In section
3.6 the results are discussed. In section 3.7, I conclude.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Studies on the United States and other countries
Approximately 90% of U.S. Congressmen rerun with success for the same
post in each election (Levitt, 1994). There is a general consensus that in-
cumbents enjoy an advantage when seeking reelection in the U.S., even if
analysts disagree about the size of this advantage and what exactly consti-
tutes it. Among the studies that have identified a clear incumbency advan-
tage are Erikson (1971); Gelman and King (1990); Cox and Katz (1996);
Ansolabehere et al. (2000); Lee (2008); and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009),
among others.
Most of these studies focus on the vote share as the outcome of inter-
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est and condition their analysis one way or another on rerunning. They
often employ a variety of quasi-natural experimental techniques to deal with
methodological challenges related to self-selection. Erikson (1971) compares
the vote share of a politician running for the second time for the same post
with the politician’s vote share in the first election, after taken into account a
number of confounding factors. Ansolabehere et al. (2000) use redistricting
to contrast incumbent’s vote share in new parts of a district with the vote
share in old parts of the same district. They found that a large portion of
the incumbency advantage owes to the personal vote.
In order to account for individual fixed effects and control for the qual-
ity of the challenger when estimating the incumbency effect on the vote
share, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) focus on winners and runners-up that face
each other repeatedly. They acknowledge the selection bias in their sam-
ple, as runners-up and winners rerun at different rates. However, through a
difference-in-difference analysis, they are able to tackle the problem of indi-
vidual characteristics of rerunners that often make this kind of investigation
difficult.
Lee (2008) uses a regression discontinuity design to uncover the effects
of partisan incumbency on U.S. House elections. Lee defines incumbency
advantage at the party level and by doing so avoids the selection problem.
He defines as counterfactual for the average outcome of an incumbent the
average outcome of runner-ups from the same party.
Gelman and King (1990) take the vote share of a party in an open-seat
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race as the valid counterfactual for the races where the party has the incum-
bent candidate. For the authors, incumbency advantage is defined as the
difference in these quantities, that is, between the vote share of a party in
those districts where it has the incumbent and the vote share of the party
when the race takes place in districts with open-seats.
These techniques have been successfully applied in other countries. Lin-
den (2004) employed the same theoretical model as Lee (2008) to investigate
Indian parliamentary national elections. He found that in the period 1980-
1989 incumbents were 7 to 10% more likely to be elected to Parliament than
challengers. The advantage turned into disadvantage a few years later, as the
author identified a negative effect of 14% related to incumbency after 1991.
Uppal (2008) used the same regression discontinuity design employed by
Lee (2008) to investigate the effects of incumbency in Indian legislative state
elections. Uppal confirmed the negative bias towards incumbents, measured
both as vote shares and as the probability of reelection. Incumbents in India
were less likely to win compared to challengers and the negative effect of
incumbency increased after 1991. Uppal also found that incumbents had
greater disadvantage at the state level than at the national level and that
the variation in incumbency effects across Indian states was related to the
state’s ability to provide public goods. He considers this to be an indication
that in poorer states the local elites might have hijacked the policy making
process.
However, one aspect that has been so far neglected by the literature is the
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relation between incumbency status and electoral systems. If incumbency is
indeed a source of advantage (or disadvantage, as it seems to be the case in
developing countries), does it matter whether seats are won in accordance to
a majority or a proportional principle?2 Are incumbents in executive posts
subject to an incumbency effect that is somehow different from the one of
their counterparts in the legislative branch?
The question here involves two complementary issues. One question re-
lates to how many officials are collectively responsible for the adoption of a
certain policy in the eyes of voters. If the adoption/implementation of a pol-
icy can be clearly attributed to one official (President, Governor or Mayor,
for instance), the identification of responsibility by voters is straightforward.
The situation is different when the attribution of responsibility is diffuse.
This is the case, for instance, when a number of city councilors approves
new legislation for the city. Here voters will have much greater difficulty in
knowing who they hold responsible for a piece of legislation. The smaller the
number of officials in charge of the approval of certain policy, the easier it is
for voters to identify the official(s) responsible.
The other issue relates to whether posts are filled according to a major-
ity or a proportional principle. Elections for executive positions (President,
Governor or Mayor) are essentially majoritarian. Elections for legislative po-
2For instance, the existing literature beyond the U.S. case has consistently identified
an incumbency advantage in majority elections. See, for instance, Kendall and Rekkas
2012 for a study on Canada; Horiuchi and Leigh 2009 for Australia; Eggers and Stirling
2013 for the U.K.; and Freier 2011 for Germany.
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sitions can be either majoritarian (for instance, in the case of single member
districts, as in the US) or proportional (as it is the case in Brazil), depending
on the size of the district.
Holders of executive posts can be easily identified by voters as responsible
for government policies. Their position makes them susceptible to being more
explicitly rewarded or punished by the voter. For this reason, regardless of
whether incumbency is considered to be an advantage or a disadvantage, I
believe its effect should be bigger in posts filled by majority elections.
The situation is somewhat more complex in the case of positions filled
according to proportional representation, where multiple representatives are
elected from the same district on the basis of proportions of votes received by
the parties they belong to. Any comparison with majority elections becomes
challenging due to the fact that there is, to my knowledge, no previous study
that investigates results from majority and proportional elections for the
same country in the same period. In any case, in situations where there
are multiple incumbents it might be more difficult for the average voter to
identify who to reward or to blame. Ordinary legislators might find it difficult
to claim enough credit to gain reelection as voters cannot ascribe outcomes
to individual representatives. Moreover, the average voter tends to pay more
attention to the activities developed by the executive branch - which is in
charge of managing daily public services - than to legislators.
In the studies where proportional voting was previously analyzed, the
record found was mixed: some have found evidence of incumbency advantage
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(Dahlgaard 2013 for Danish local councilors), while others did not identify
any advantage (Golden and Picci 2015 for Italian legislators) or found a neg-
ative effect (Ariga 2010 in Japan). In the example of proportional elections I
propose to investigate in this paper (city council elections in Brazil), incum-
bents are not seen as independent political actors the way mayors are and
their responsibility is strictly limited in the eye of citizens (see below for a
more detailed discussion). For this reason, I believe that even if incumbency
is a valuable cue for voters in the case of proportional elections, its effects
should be considerably smaller in comparison to majority elections.
Briefly, as I propose to use different methodologies to investigate incum-
bency according to whether the incumbent running for office faces a majority
or a proportional election, my main hypothesis is that the effect should not
be the same - at least in Brazil-, considering the nature of the positions
in dispute. Any effect should be bigger in elections for mayor than in city
council elections (section 3).
3.2.2 Studies about Brazil
In contrast to the extensive literature on the subject in the U.S., the literature
on incumbency in Brazil is not so well developed. Only relatively recently,
when the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,
TSE ) started to systematically release information on municipal, state and
national elections did data became available to scholars on Brazil to start
looking for empirical evidence on some of the questions that had occupied
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their counterparts in the U.S. for decades.
Brazilian scholars have been particularly attracted to factors that are
correlated with the decision of incumbents to run for reelection, like their
strategic behavior while in office. This is the case, for instance, of Leoni,
Pereira and Renno (2004), and Meneguin, Bugarin and Carvalho (2005).
Other scholars have focused on factors correlated with good electoral perfor-
mance, like having a certain profession or belonging to a major party (Cervi,
Costa, Codato and Perissinoto, 2013). One particular factor highlighted by
the Brazilian literature is the correlation between financial resources and the
probability of being elected for Congress (Lemos, Marcelino e Pederiva, 2010;
Cervi, Costa, Codato and Perissinoto, 2013).
Specifically with respect to incumbency advantage, some studies over the
last few years have made significant contributions. Using public available
data, Boas and Hidalgo (2011) identified a significant positive effect of in-
cumbency on the ability of politicians to control the media, while others have
identified a negative effect on electoral performance for parties (Titiunik 2009;
Klasnja and Titiunik, 2017) and candidates (Brambor and Ceneviva, 2011).
Titiunik (2009) gave a significant contribution to the study of incumbency
in Brazilian elections by repeating the regression discontinuity design previ-
ously applied by Lee (2008) to the U.S. context. Titiunik focuses on parties,
not on personal incumbency, and uses data publicly available from the 2000
and 2004 municipal elections to find a strong adverse effect of incumbency on
both the probability of reelection and vote share in the subsequent election.
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In a later work (Titiunik and Klasnja, 2017), the author investigates further
the negative effect of incumbency (for which she also finds evidence in other
Latin American countries) and theorizes the reasons behind it (term limits
and weak parties, both of which affect the incentives of individual politicians
and generate party losses).
Brambor and Ceneviva (2011) employed the same methodology as Levitt
and Wolfram (1997) to assess incumbency advantage in Brazilian munici-
pal elections. As in the original article, the authors restrict their sample to
winners and runners-up who rerun and remove any specific characteristics re-
lated to candidates and place through a difference-in-difference design. Their
findings support the view that incumbency may have a negative effect on the
vote shares of candidates in developing countries.
Finally, Magalhães (2014) has questioned previous work indicating that
using methods developed for the U.S. may result in sample selection bias
when applied to countries like Brazil. Specifically, Magalhães states that in
countries where rerunning is not widespread, focusing on the vote share of
candidates might not be appropriate. He proposes to investigate the effects




In 2008 and 2012 voters chose mayors and aldermen for 5568 municipalities
in Brazil. In most Brazilian cities - those with less than 200,000 voters -
mayors were elected according to a simple majority principle: the candidate
who received more votes gained office. In cities with more than 200,000 voters
there was a runoff between the two candidates who had received more votes,
in case none of them achieved the benchmark of 50 per cent plus one of valid
votes. This process ensures that the future mayor has the support of at least
half of voters. The city council was elected using an open list proportional
representation system. Seats are allocated using a version of the D’Hondt
method where only parties (or coalitions) that receive at least V/n votes may
win seats in the legislature (where V is the total number of votes cast and n
is the total number of seats to be filled).
Examining the overall results of 2008 and 2012, we see that the elec-
toral landscape remained unchanged in a number of aspects (Tables 3.1 and
3.2): characteristics like the average educational level, age, sex and profes-
sional profile of elected candidates remained largely unaffected. Among the
winner mayor candidates, around 47% had a college degree, while 27% had
finished high school. Women candidates won in 2012 more seats for mayor
and increased their share as head of the municipal executive from 9 to 12%,
but their participation in municipal councils remained stable (12-13%). At
least 40% of the mayoral seats were assigned to candidates belonging to the 3
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biggest parties (there are currently 35 in Brazil), while in city coucil elections
this percentage stayed above 32%.




Middle School 0.27 0.27




Age 35-44 0.29 0.26




Source: Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
Overall, the 2012 election represented the consolidation at the municipal
level of the influence of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT ),
the party of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), the president during
whose term in office economic growth was restored and broad social poli-
cies successfully implemented, before a number of corruption scandals and
a strong political and economic crisis led to the impeachment of his succes-
sor and former co-worker, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Although the Party
of the Democratic Movement of Brazil (Partido do Movimento Democrático
Brasileiro, PMDB), the largest party in Brazil, won a bigger share of mayor
positions in that election, the PT achieved more victories in big cities (cities
with more than 200,000 voters) and was able to achieve a solid number of
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Middle School 0.37 0.36




Age 35-44 0.33 0.34




Source: Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
mayor positions in smaller municipalities. The number of municipalities un-
der the control of the PT increased to 11%. It decreased respectively to 18%
and 12% for the PMDB and the PSDB, the other two biggest parties. In
municipal councils, the PT increased the number of seats under its control
from 8 to 9%, while the number of seats belonging to members of the PMDB
and PSDB deacreased from 16 and 11% to 14 and 9%, respectively.
Given prior work on incumbency in Brazil, we know that incumbent
parties are disadvantaged when their politicians run for reelection (Titiu-
nik 2009; Klasnja and Titiunik 2017; Brambor and Ceneviva 2011). Once
the focus of analysis becomes personal incumbency, the studies have clearly
shown that incumbents in Brazil have no advantage over challengers. Actu-
ally, the studies concluded that incumbents perform, on average, worse than
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runners-up/challengers.3 We don’t know, however, how incumbents running
in majority elections fare compared to incumbents standing for proportional
elections.
In the case of mayor incumbent candidates, who are elected according to
a majority principle, the negative effect of incumbency, if confirmed, should
be bigger than in the case of city council incumbents. The explanation here
is related to the capacity of voters to hold incumbent mayor politicians ac-
countable for unsatisfactory performance of municipal services. There is
strong evidence that citizens are capable of holding government accountable
at least as far as the general state of the economy is concerned (Page and
Shapiro 1992). However, voters in American local communities are often
confused about to whom they should attribute responsibility for the perfor-
mance of certain public services (Arcenaux 2006; Lions and Lowery 1989;
Rudolph 2006; Sances 2017).
In Brazil, I believe the hurdles identified in the literature, as far as the
capacity of voters to attribute responsibility for public services is concerned,
are less of a problem. Mayor offices are generally identified clearly with the
provision of a number of public goods like garbage collection, health services,
education and transport. Especially in small cities, which are the vast ma-
3In a forthcoming paper, Boas, Hidalgo & Toral note that Brazilian mayors are also
subject to unexpected and perverse accountability effects. They find that citizens to whom
school education is important - parents with children in municipal schools - do reward
mayors for the quality of the education provided, while other citizens perceive trade-offs
between municipal schooling and other types of services, leading to an overall decrease in
electoral support for the incumbent. See Boas, Hidalgo & Toral, 2020.
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jority of municipalities in Brazil, mayors are seen in the public eye as respon-
sible for services considered essential to city dwellers. Most voters have little
knowledge/interest in the complexities involved in identifying the agencies
responsible for providing specific services, taking the “local government” as
the general cue to attribute responsibilities. A study of 2004 confirmed this
perception, as it found evidence that a good performance by the incumbent
mayor, even if it was not the unique factor responsible for electoral results,
exerted a positive effect on reelection chances (Mendes e Rocha, 2004). It is
reasonable to assume that, in the Brazilian context, voters are generally able
to hold mayors accountable for the performance of public municipal services,
using this to support their general appraisal of incumbents. An increase in
the negative effect of incumbency for Brazilian mayors should be at least
partly explained by the fact that voters can easily attribute to them any
dissatisfaction (real or imaginary) related to the provision of these services.
In the case of aldermen, this identification is much weaker. As the role
of the city council is to legislate and to provide a check on executive power,
it is natural that the work of their members attracts much less the public
attention. Moreover, the issues on which city councils are allowed to legis-
late are limited to those of local relevance. In practice, city council members
are subordinate to mayors, often declining from truly monitoring the head
to executive and aligning with him in order to achieve greater visibility and
name recognition from voters (Joffre Neto, 2001). In the limited sphere of
local politics, city council members are not seen as independent actors the
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way congressmen are at the federal level.4 For these reasons, there should be
less identification of them with any daily problem related to the local govern-
ment. Incumbent city councilors should be less affected by the incumbency
effect when running for reelection.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Difference-in-difference analysis
As a way to avoid the problem of characteristics that account for candidate
quality (either observable or unobservable) and could bias the estimate I am
trying to calculate, I will initially focus on candidates who face each other
in two subsequent elections. Analysis will be carried out on the basis of
candidate pairs within municipalities. Each pair is composed of candidates
who run for a certain post with the following specifications:
(a)At t=0 (2008 election), one candidate runs as non-incumbent, wins
and becomes an incumbent; the other candidate runs as non-incumbent and
is not elected;
(b)At t=1 (2012 election), the candidate who was elected returns to the
electoral arena to run as incumbent for the same post; the candidate who
was not elected also returns to the contest and faces the same adversary (now
4Joffre Neto points out - page 69 -, on the basis of an experiment involving members
from municipal councils from 112 Brazilian cities, that almost half of them consider their
role not to be independent of the mayor. They also believe their job is to assist the mayor
and having good relations to him.
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incumbent) again;
My sample would have to be restricted to open seats in t=0 in order
to allow for an adequate evaluation of the effects of incumbency. Focusing
on pairs of candidates who face each other repeatedly makes it easier to
isolate the variation in electoral returns generated by incumbency alone. It
is important to stress that focusing on repeated pairs of candidates allows us
to avoid the need to achieve balance of pre-treatment covariates that remain
unchanged among treatment (elected) and control (not elected) groups, as
these characteristics will cancel out in the end. This is the case, for instance,
for color, sex and level of instruction.
The basic model could be stated as follows:
V tik = αk + β ∗ I tik + θit + ηtik
Where V tik represents the voteshare of candidate k in municipality i in
election held at time t ; αk stands for the set of fixed attributes of the candi-
date; I tik indicates whether the candidate is an incumbent or not; θit stands
for the characteristics of the municipality; and η is the error term. We are
interested in the value of the estimate β, which represent the effect of incum-
bency on electoral results.
When we take the difference of the vote share of two candidates that faced
each other in election t we find that the difference in candidate qualities (α1
and α2) are kept.
∆V tik = V
t
i1 − V ti2 = (α1 − α2) + β ∗ (I ti1 − I ti2) + νit
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Repeating this procedures across time periods (as I intend to do for elections
held in 2008 and 2012) we obtain
∆i = ∆V
1
i −∆V 2i = β ∗ [(I1i1 − I1i2)− (I2i1 − I2i2)] + (ν1i − ν2i )
where all measures of candidate quality (observable and unobservable) are
also absent, giving us some confidence that the bias in estimating β is re-
duced.
3.4.2 Regression discontinuity design
In a regression discontinuity design, units display a certain score. Units
whose score is above a certain threshold receive the treatment; units below
the threshold belong to the control group. This approach takes advantage
of the fact that political actors cannot control precisely electoral outcomes.
Under appropriate assumptions, a comparison of units above and below the
threshold can be used to disclose the causal effect of the treatment on some
outcome of interest.
The idea behind the RD design is to take advantage of available data
and focus on elections where the performance of winner and loser candidates
is very close. By comparing candidates who barely win to candidates who
barely lose, the design allows us to isolate the local causal effect of incum-
bency around the cutoff point.
In this paper, the unit of observation is the individual politician. In order
to identify those cases where the performance of winner and losers was very
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close I have adopted the procedure employed by Boas and Hidalgo (2011) and
used the margin of victory in the 2008 election as the score variable. In the
case of mayoral elections, the margin of victory was calculated subtracting
the vote share of the runner up from the vote share for the winner (and
vice-versa). In the case of elections for local councils, the margin of victory
was calculated subtracting the vote share of the candidate from the vote
share of the “last winner” from the same coalition (the candidate elected
with the smallest quantity of votes within the coalition) if the candidate lost,
and from the vote share of the “first loser” from the same coalition (losing
candidate with largest quantity of votes within the coalition) if the candidate
was elected.
I have used the rdrobust package to perform bandwidth selection and
to construct local-polynomial point estimators as well as robust confidence
intervals for average treatment effects at the cutoff. I have used polynomials
of order 1 (local linear regression), 2 and 3 to find different bandwidths. For
each bandwidth I have regressed the margin of victory in election t=1 against
the margin of victory in time t=0, a dummy variable for treatment and a
number of controls for the different sources of money received.
The issue of unconditional probability
In both the difference-in-difference and the regression discontinuity approaches
I have used candidates’ vote share as my outcome variable. Using the vote
share has been widely adopted in the studies on incumbency advantage in
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the US and in other countries, as described in the literature review section.
However, there has recently been some criticism of it, mainly due to the fact
while it may be appropriate to use the vote share in countries where rerun-
ning rates are high - like the US -, it might not be adequate in other places
- like Brazil - where rerunning is not so widespread (Magalhães, 2015).
Magalhães (2015) proposes a different outcome variable which he believes
allows one to compare incumbent advantage across countries with different
rerunning rates. He uses the unconditional probability of rerunning and
winning, which is a categorical variable assuming the value 1 if the candidate
runs a second time and wins and zero otherwise, to investigate incumbency
advantage for mayor candidates in the 2000 elections in Brazil.
Although I agree with Magalhães that adopting the unconditional proba-
bility as outcome variable can give valuable insights in single member district
elections (as it is the case for mayors in Brazil), I believe this procedure should
not be used for proportional city council elections. City council elections in
Brazil are very particular for a number of reasons. City councilors are not
regarded as independent political actors as mayors. Besides, the rerunning
rates are very uneven among incumbents and challengers for the city council
(Appendix A). Most candidates try to be elected once and, if they fail, simply
go on with their lives. Even among elected candidates the rerunning rate is
not particular high, as I describe below. For these reasons, I have opted for
not including an analysis using the unconditional probability here, but have
put it in the Appendix A below for comparison.
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3.5 Data
To study the effects of incumbency in Brazil, we contructed a dataset with
information publicly available from the Superior Electoral Tribunal (TSE).
The data related to elections in 2008 and 2012 was downloaded in multiple
files, which had to be merged to form a unique dataset.
The data provides information on the election of candidates for mayor
and aldermen. In most Brazilian cities - those with less than 200,000 voters
- the results for mayor are determined according to a simple majority: the
candidate with more votes wins the election. In municipalities with more
than 200,000 inhabitants, to be elected mayor a candidate must gain 50 per
cent plus one of the valid votes in the first round. If no candidate reaches
this amount of votes, a second round takes place in which the two candidates
who received the most votes in the first round are picked against each other.
This process guarantees that the elected mayor is supported by at least 50
per cent of voters.
In 2008, the average vote share of mayor candidates was 38% (median
43%). Winning candidates were elected with vote shares starting at a mere
21% and averaging 57% (Among all losing candidates in 2008 the average
vote share was 26%).
Elections to the House of Representatives, the Legislative Assemblies and
the local councils take place according to a proportional voting principle: the
voter enters the desired candidate or party code into an electronic ballot box.
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Parties always have the same code; the codes for candidates are informed
during the electoral campaign. More than 90 percent of votes go directly
to candidates; only the few remaining are cast for parties. Candidates are
presented in open lists selected by parties or coalitions of parties. Coalition
partners lose their identity and compete in a single “basket” of votes.
Candidates for local councils received in 2008 an average 5% of vote
shares. The average vote share of winning candidates stayed around 9%
while losing candidates received, on average, less than 1% of vote shares.
In our dataset each observation is a candidate. For each candidate we
have inserted basic information (name, electoral identification number and
tax identification number), as well as personal characteristics like year of
birth, education level, occupation, etc. Candidates are also identified by their
municipality and their state. As we are dealing with two subsequent elections,
we had to insert for each candidate/observation the following information
for years 2008 and 2012: electoral performance (elected or not), quantity
of votes received, party identification, name of the coalition, parties that
formed the coalition in that election, etc. For each candidate/observation
we have calculated the respective vote share in the election (amount of total
votes received by the candidate divided by the total amount of votes in
the municipality for that specific position). In the case of mayoral races in
those municipalities where there was a second round (there were 30 cities
in this situation in 2008 and 50 in 2012) we had to use a slightly different
procedure and focus on the runoff in order to calculate vote margins and
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vote shares. In any case, when calculating the outcome variable (vote share
in 2012) we focused on the first round, so as to have a similar procedure for
all candidates.5
The donations received had to be aggregated by candidate and separated
according to their origin, for instance, whether they came from a corpo-
ration, from the party, from individuals or were funds from the candidate
himself/herself. This data was merged back in the original file with the vote
shares and electoral performance.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below present descriptive statistics for mayor candi-
dates and candidates for municipal assemblies in our full sample. Contribu-
tions are measured as the natural log of the amount received in Brazilian
Reais. Looking at both tables one immediately realizes the main difficulty
in comparing treatment and control groups through an OLS model to assess
the effect of incumbency, that is, the fact that the groups are not balanced
in all background characteristics. These background characteristics - if not
balanced - could easily bias our estimate, as they could influence both the
independent variable (incumbency) and our outcome variable (vote shares).
A variable like college education, for instance, which is unbalanced when we
consider city council candidates, is likely to influence both the capacity of
a candidate to become incumbent and to win vote shares, thus biasing our
estimate upwards. More importantly, key variables related to the amount
5Actually the number of cases in which we had to focus on the runoff very small, since
there were only a handful of cases when the same two candidates facing each other in the
2008 runoff also ran again in 2012.
86
of money at the disposal of candidates, like corporate donations and candi-
dates’ own resources spent in the campaign are not balanced, as shown in
both tables.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 2008 Mayor Candidates (N=3,678)
mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.10 0.11 0.147
Primary Education 0.06 0.07 0.022
Middle School 0.26 0.25 0.295
College 0.46 0.46 0.76
Lawyer 0.04 0.06 0.005
Salesman 0.11 0.11 0.945
Businessman 0.12 0.12 0.85
PMDB 0.19 0.14 0.000
PSDB 0.13 0.10 0.003
PT 0.12 0.12 0.64
Sao Paulo 0.10 0.13 0.014
Minas Gerais 0.14 0.17 0.034
Corporate donations 5.25 4.17 0.000
Own resources 6.86 6.27 0.000
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics 2008 Alderman Candidates (N=16,061)
mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.10 0.16 0.000
Primary Education 0.14 0.16 0.000
Middle School 0.33 0.32 0.190
College 0.20 0.16 0.000
Lawyer 0.02 0.01 0.006
Salesman 0.10 0.10 0.833
Businessman 0.03 0.02 0.002
PMDB 0.15 0.03 0.000
PSDB 0.10 0.03 0.000
PT 0.09 0.12 0.000
Sao Paulo 0.12 0.31 0.000
Minas Gerais 0.15 0.14 0.205
Rio de Janeiro 0.02 0.07 0.000
Corporate donations 1.23 0.72 0.000
Own resources 5.67 3.13 0.000
In the difference in difference analysis, in order to account for the unbal-
anced variables related to financial resources, we have matched candidates
using the propensity score (the probability that the candidate will be assigned
to treatment, i.e., that he or she will be elected in 2008) and the different
sources of money received as predictors. The matching algorithm used was
the single nearest-neighbor, where an individual from the comparison group
is chosen as a matching partner for a treated individual that is closest in
terms of propensity score.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and tables 3.5 and 3.6 display the bias reduction in
our sample for the difference in difference analysis after matching on the
propensity score. We can safely proceed with inference as observations are
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now balanced.
Figure 3.1: Bias Reduction after matching mayor candidates 2008 Election
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Figure 3.2: Bias Reduction after matching aldermen candidates 2008 Election
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Bias reduction after matching − city council 2008 elections
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Table 3.5: 2008 Mayor Candidate Sample Descriptive Statistics before and
after matching (N=3,678)
unmatched/matched treated control p-value
Corporate Donations U 5.25 4.17 0.000
M 5.25 5.45 0.178
Individual contributions U 8.20 6.93 0.000
M 8.20 8.06 0.212
Own resources U 6.86 6.26 0.000
M 6.86 6.90 0.774
Moreover, in the difference-in-difference analysis the methodological issue
created by the unbalance in unchanging background characteristics and/or
characteristics related to the intrinsic quality of candidates (education, intel-
ligence, communication skills etc) is overcome as they cancel out, as described
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Table 3.6: 2008 City Council Candidate Sample Descriptive Statistics before
and after matching (N=16,061)
unmatched/matched treated control p-value
Corporate Donations U 1.23 0.72 0.000
M 1.23 1.22 0.868
Individual contributions U 4.47 2.40 0.000
M 4.47 4.45 0.741
Own resources U 5.66 3.13 0.000
M 5.66 5.71 0.230
in section 3.4.1.
In the regression discontinuity approach there was no need to follow a
similar procedure because, if our assumptions are correct (and they are, as
explained below), any problem related to unbalance in background charac-
teristics is eliminated because the variables are continuous around the point
where treatment and outcome discontinuity occur.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Mayoral Candidates
To perform the diff-in-diff analysis for mayoral candidates we had to isolate
those candidates who ran in two subsequent elections (2008 and 2012) and
identify, for each municipality, the winning candidate as well as the respective
runner-up at time t=0. Out of a total of 5568 Brazilian municipalities we
have isolated 822 observations, that is, 411 pairs of winners and runners-up
of the 2008 elections who faced each other again in 2012.
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The treatment group in our sample won the 2008 election with an average
vote share of 0.49 and achieved in the subsequent election an average vote
share of 0.45; the control group (mayoral candidates not elected in 2008)
started with an average vote share of 0.31, which increased to 0.38 in 2012.
The difference in vote shares between the two groups, which was initially 0.18
in 2008, decreased to 0.07 in 2012. The effect attributed to incumbency was
responsible for an average decrease in the difference in vote shares between
treatment and control groups of 11% from the first election. The effect of -
0.11 (95% CI[-0.13,-0.09] was statistically significant (p≤ 0.000). This finding
(table 3.7) adds confidence to the hypothesis that in majority elections in
developing countries incumbents suffer from a negative effect of holding office.
The estimate indicates that incumbency had a powerful effect on the
decrease of vote shares of incumbents once we compare our sample to the full
sample of candidates for mayoral positions in 2008/2012. In 2008, the average
winning vote share for 15,305 candidates was 0.57 and the average winning
vote margin was 0.31. In 2012, among the 15,527 candidates the average
winning vote share was 0.57 and average winning vote margin decreased to
0.23. However, in our sample incumbent mayors got elected in 2008 with an
average vote share of 0.49 (0.45 for reelection in 2012) and won by an average
vote margin of 0.18 (0.06 in 2012). The negative effect of incumbency was,
thus, equivalent to a 22% decrease in vote shares for incumbent mayors in
our sample.
In order to check the effect of incumbency I have focused on close elections
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Table 3.7: Effect of Incumbency - Mayoral Elections 2012 (N=822)
vshare winner vshare runner-up diff test diff=0
2008 0.49 0.31 0.18 0.000
2012 0.45 0.39 0.06 0.000
effect - - -0.11 0.000
in the sample and carried out a regression discontinuity design as described
in the previous section.
Figure 3.3 displays the estimated vote margin of mayoral candidates in
2012 against the vote margin in 2008. The horizontal axis represents the vote
share of candidate in time t=0 (2008 election) against its strongest opponent.
The vertical axis represents the same information for time=1 (2012 election).
We plot the data through vote margin in both years merely for convenience,
as the “jump” along the vertical line allows to visualize clearly that the
margins of victory became smaller due to the effect we are attempting to
measure.
In our figure, each dot represent mean values for winning and losing in
bins of the vote margin. Each bin represents an equal number of candidates.
The vertical line is the “border” that separates winners from losers. To the
left (right) of the vertical line, candidates lose (win). The lines to the left
and right of the vertical line are a local linear regression on each side of the
cutoff point. The graph displays a small discontinuous point at the x-axis,
which suggests that incumbency has an effect on electoral outcome measured
as difference in vote shares in close elections.
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We have initially used a local linear regression to calculate the bandwidth
(vote margin ≤ 0.097). Our sample had 1,659 observations and the point es-
timate was -0.10 (95% CI[-0.13,-0.06]. The estimate from the RD design is
close to what was found through a diff-in-diff analysis and is statistically
significant at 95% (p-value=0.000). For the purpose of comparison, we have
also used larger bandwidths equal to 0.154 and 0.185, which are applicable
when we use polynomials of second and third order. The statistically signif-
icant coefficients were -0.09 and -0.10. The coefficients from the RD (table
3.8) are very close to the diff-in-diff, although slightly smaller.
To check the basic assumption behind the regression discontinuity design
I have tested the balance of covariates of candidates in the sample through
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Table 3.8: Effect of Incumbency Mayoral Elec-
tions 2012 - RD estimates
vote margin ≤ 0.097 ≤ 0.154 ≤ 0.185
point estimate τ -0.10 -0.09 -0.10
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,659 2,340 2,386
The DV for the regression discontinuity is the vote margin in 2012,
scaled from -1 to 1, which is regressed against the vote margin in
2008 (scaled the same way), a dummy variable for treatment and an
interaction term. We use a local linear regression, a polynomial of
order 2 and of order 3, respectively.
a t-test comparing elected and nonelected candidates. If our assumptions
are correct, bare winners and losers in close elections should be similar on
background characteristics.
Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 display the balance of 14 covariates for each
discontinuity sample. Balance is present for most covariates in all three
samples, although it gets slightly worse as the sample grows bigger.
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Table 3.9: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.097 (N=1,659)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.10 0.12 0.29
Married 0.76 0.76 0.98
Primary Education 0.06 0.06 0.95
Middle School 0.27 0.26 0.77
College 0.45 0.43 0.54
Lawyer 0.04 0.06 0.12
Salesman 0.11 0.12 0.51
Businessman 0.11 0.12 0.52
Party: PSDB 0.14 0.11 0.09
Party: PT 0.12 0.10 0.23
Party: PMDB 0.20 0.18 0.23
SP 0.09 0.10 0.52
MG 0.14 0.15 0.92
RJ 0.03 0.04 0.62
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Table 3.10: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.154 (N=2,286)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.12 0.35
Married 0.76 0.75 0.79
Primary Education 0.05 0.06 0.23
Middle School 0.26 0.26 0.97
College 0.46 0.45 0.64
Lawyer 0.04 0.06 0.08
Salesman 0.10 0.11 0.46
Businessman 0.12 0.12 0.84
Party: PSDB 0.13 0.11 0.10
Party: PT 0.12 0.11 0.47
Party: PMDB 0.21 0.17 0.04
SP 0.09 0.09 0.86
MG 0.14 0.17 0.06
RJ 0.01 0.01 0.29
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Table 3.11: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.185 (N=2,586)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.12 0.35
Married 0.76 0.75 0.79
Primary Education 0.05 0.07 0.06
Middle School 0.27 0.26 0.51
College 0.46 0.45 0.65
Lawyer 0.05 0.06 0.16
Salesman 0.10 0.12 0.30
Businessman 0.12 0.12 0.81
Party: PSDB 0.13 0.11 0.07
Party: PT 0.12 0.11 0.40
Party: PMDB 0.21 0.17 0.03
SP 0.09 0.10 0.51
MG 0.14 0.17 0.08
RJ 0.01 0.01 0.52
For mayors, there is a general negative effect which is associated with
incumbency. Compared to their opponents, those who managed to be re-
elected perform worse in vote shares the second time they run. This is true
even when we use smaller bandwidths. The general effect of anti-incumbency
vote was clearly visible in both situations examined.
3.6.2 Alderman Candidates
Legislative elections in Brazil take place according to a proportional principle
and open lists. Depending on the number of inhabitants, each municipal
house is assigned a specific number of seats. In order to know how many
seats a party (a coalition) wins it is necessary to divide the number of votes
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received by the party (coalition) by a number called “the electoral quotient”
(quociente eleitoral). The electoral quotient is found dividing the number
of valid votes in the election by the corresponding number of seats in the
municipal council.
Because of the way the electoral system works, it often happens that
candidates who receive a large amount of votes do not win a seat. For
instance, in a municipality where the Municipal House of Representatives
is allowed to have up to 17 seats and where there were 60,000 valid votes
in the last election, the electoral quotient would be equivalent to 3,529. In
order to win one seat, a party (coalition) would have to reach this minimum
threshold of votes. If it does not, a candidate from this party will not win
a seat even if he/she received a large number of votes (say, 3,500 votes). If
a party receives an amount of votes larger than the minumum, it wins the
corresponding number of seats, even if individually some of its candidates
have scored below the threshold. A candidate from a party that wins a
number of seats will be in a position to gain office even if his/her voting was
smaller than the voting of candidates from parties that did not achieve the
minimum threshold.
Due to this characteristic of Brazilian proportional elections, it is common
that parties (coalitions) look for public, well-know figures as candidates, as
they can improve the total amount of votes received by the party and, thus,
increase the number of seats won. A public figure that gets a substantial
support from voters (even if he or she has little political experience) helps
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elect other candidates from the same party. In 2014, in the national elections
for Congress (which are also proportional), a candidate from São Paulo,
Francisco Everardo Oliveira Silva, best known as “Tiririca”, an actor and
famous clown in the state, won more than 1 million votes and helped electing
five other candidates, two of which would probably not have reached office
otherwise.
To investigate the effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes in the case
of aldermen candidates I have initially repeated the diff-in-diff analysis car-
ried out for mayor candidates. I have isolated 620 pairs of candidates (1,240
observations) that repeatedly face each other.
Comparing treatment and control groups we find a negative effect of in-
cumbency equivalent to 0.006 of the difference in vote shares between treat-
ment and control groups from 2008 to 2012 (table 3.12). The confidence
interval for this effect is [-0.009, -0.003]. The effect is statistically significant
(p≤ 0.000). In our sample, winning candidates in 2008 (treatment group)
scored an average vote share of 6.1% and were reelected in 2012 with an av-
erage 6.8%. However, the average vote share received by winning candidates
in 2008 and 2012 (more than 350,000 candidates each year) remained around
9%. The pool of losing candidates received in these years an average vote
share of slightly less than 1%. Our effect, although smaller than what we
have found for incumbent mayor candidates, is not negligible, corresponding
to a decrease in 10% of the average vote share received by winning candidates
in 2008 for the city council from our sample.
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Table 3.12: Effect of Incumbency - City Council Elections 2012 (N=1,240)
vshare winner vshare runner-up diff test diff=0
2008 0.061 0.029 0.034 0.000
2012 0.068 0.043 0.028 0.000
effect - - -0.006 0.000
To complement the analysis, we have carried out a regression discontinuity
design as explained in the methodology section. Figure 3.4 displays the
discontinuity around the cutoff using all observations (N=16,061). The y
axis displays the margin of victory when time t=1 (2012 election); the x axis
displays the margin of victory when time t=0 (2008 election). We find no
“jump” or clear discontinuity at the cutoff point.
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The local effects were not statistically significant, regardless of the band-
width used (table 3.13). They are, however, of the same signal (negative)
and similar magnitude of the estimate found in the difference-in-difference
analysis, giving us some confidence in the result achieved before. For each of
the bandwidths used, treatment and control groups were reasonably balanced
with regards to pretreatment variables (Tables 3.14, 3.15, 3.16).
Table 3.13: Effect of Incumbency Aldermen Elec-
tions 2012 - RD estimates
vote margin ≤ 0.010 ≤ 0.014 ≤ 0.017
point estimate τ -0.02 -0.004 -0.010
p-value (0.330) (0.640) (0.192)
N 895 1,209 1,457
The DV for the regression discontinuity is the vote margin in 2012,
scaled from -1 to 1, which is regressed against the vote margin in
2008 (scaled the same way), a dummy variable for treatment and an
interaction term. We use a local linear regression, a polynomial of
order 2 and of order 3, respectively.
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Table 3.14: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.010 (N=895)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.093 0.093 0.984
Primary Education 0.10 0.09 0.81
Middle School 0.29 0.37 0.27
College 0.31 0.20 0.14
Lawyer 0.03 0.02 0.65
Salesman 0.12 0.09 0.56
Businessman 0.05 0.07 0.43
Sao Paulo 0.19 0.34 0.01
Minas Gerais 0.18 0.18 0.97
Rio de Janeiro 0.10 0.07 0.45
Party: PSDB 0.08 0.07 0.73
Party: PT 0.09 0 0.03
Party: PMDB 0.15 0 0.005
It makes sense that aldermen do not suffer from the anti-incumbency
vote as harshly as mayor candidates, even when they are being reelected by
smaller vote shares in comparison to their strongest opponents. In Brazilian
municipalities, mayors are clearly identified with the provision of public ser-
vices like water, garbage collection or schooling. When voters are unhappy
with the provision of services where they live, they tend to hold the city
mayor accountable for many of their problems. In the case of aldermen, this
identification is much weaker. The mere fact that someone is already known
as alderman is probably a big help in the reelection campaign.
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Table 3.15: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.014 (N=1,209)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.09 0.12 0.36
Primary Education 0.10 0.08 0.60
Middle School 0.30 0.31 0.79
College 0.30 0.26 0.47
Lawyer 0.03 0.02 0.71
Salesman 0.11 0.08 0.50
Businessman 0.05 0.08 0.28
Sao Paulo 0.19 0.43 0.000
Minas Gerais 0.19 0.15 0.38
Rio de Janeiro 0.09 0.03 0.10
Party: PSDB 0.08 0.06 0.44
Party: PT 0.1 0.01 0.01
Party: PMDB 0.15 0 0.000
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have used different two different approaches - difference-
in-difference and regression discontinuity - to check incumbency effects in
Brazilian elections for municipal executive and legislative posts. The point
of departure for this investigation were the robust findings in the literature
in the U.S. that incumbency represents a clear electoral advantage, and the
relatively few studies on other countries, where the findings indicated that
incumbency was a source of disadvantage, at least in recent democracies.
In performing the analysis above, we have focused on a question so far
largely ignored by the literature: whether any potential incumbency effect
has similar magnitudes in majority and proportional elections. To carry
out this investigation, we have used data from two subsequent municipal
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Table 3.16: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.017 (N=1,457)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.09 0.10 0.59
Primary Education 0.11 0.14 0.28
Middle School 0.31 0.30 0.80
College 0.29 0.27 0.64
Lawyer 0.03 0.03 0.77
Salesman 0.11 0.12 0.63
Businessman 0.05 0.08 0.10
Sao Paulo 0.19 0.41 0.000
Minas Gerais 0.18 0.15 0.30
Rio de Janeiro 0.09 0.07 0.53
Party: PSDB 0.09 0.04 0.06
Party: PT 0.09 0.03 0.01
Party: PMDB 0.15 0 0.000
elections, in 2008 and 2012. Our outcome variable has been the vote share
of candidates in 2012.
The picture that emerges from the results found is that in Brazil the ef-
fects of incumbency are negative regardless of whether the incumbent was
elected in a majority or in a proportional elections, although in the case of
candidates elected in proportional elections (city councilors), the magnitude
was smaller. This is so not only because they receive much smaller vote
shares that mayor candidates, but also because, unlike mayors, in Brazilian
municipalities city councilors are not seen as independent politicians respon-
sible for the provision of public goods. Due to the nature of their post, it is
not easy for city councilors to claim credit for the successful implementation
of municipal policies. At the same time, differently from mayors, they are
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not held accountable for the performance of municipal services and other
relevant issues regarding the daily life in Brazilian cities.
Our findings were in line with previous work on mayoral elections in
Brazil, notably Titiunik (2009), Brambor and Ceneviva (2011) and Klasnja
and Titiunik (2017). Most affected by anti-incumbency vote are the Brazilian
mayors, who undergo a sharp decrease in their vote shares when they run for
office a second time.
The fact that the negative effect of incumbency is bigger in the case of
mayoral candidates makes sense in view of the fact that mayor offices are
responsible for the provision of a number of municipal services and that
voters in Brazilian cities are aware of this fact. In Brazilian cities mayors
are known by voters to be in charge of the adequate provision of a number
of public goods. This is not the case of aldermen, whose main activity is to
legislate and who attract much less attention from voters.
These findings shed some additional light on the common perception that
incumbency is not as valuable an advantage in young democracies - much
the opposite! - as in advanced industrial democracies. However, a number of
questions remain open and should be explored in future work, especially in
proportional elections. We still lack a better understanding of how the effects
of incumbency are mediated by the way party leaders rank the position of
incumbents and challengers on their party lists. Another question relates
to whether a similar effect would have been found in proportional elections
where incumbents - differently from what is the case in Brazilian cities -
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In the previous chapter I have used a difference-in-difference and a regression
discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of incumbency in Brazil, mea-
sured as the electoral performance of incumbent candidates in vote shares.
One key aspect of the 2008 and 2012 elections is that they took place in a
context where candidates could finance their campaign either through pub-
lic or private funds, including donations from corporations. That situation
changed dramatically as of 2016, when the Supreme Court decision of a year
before that banned corporate donations as a lawful source of funds for Brazil-
ian candidates came into force.
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The main stated purpose of the historic Supreme Court decision to ban
corporate financing in Brazilian Elections was, in the words of the rapporteur
of the case, to level the playing field among candidates. Yet political playing
fields are notoriously difficult to level. By removing one campaigning ad-
vantage -corporate fundraising-, one naturally shifts the weight toward other
advantages that might accrue to particular candidates, such as charisma, ex-
perience, or clientelistic networks. One of the most significant advantages
that has been identified in the literature is related to incumbency. There
are quite a few studies on incumbency advantage in American Politics which
account for the general consensus that incumbents enjoy a large advantage
in elections to the US House of Representatives. How large that advantage
actually is remains, however, a matter of controversy.1
In a context like the Brazilian, where the electoral system is much different
from the US, it is particularly unclear whether removing corporate donations
would actually help challengers. Not only the quantity of parties in Brazil
is huge (35 parties, each of them entitled to present candidates for executive
and legislative positions), but also each municipality works in practice as
an independent electoral district. This often creates confusion to the voter,
as the amount of candidates for each post can be very large, especially for
legislative positions. Candidates - either incumbents or challengers - badly
1Among the most significant studies we may cite Erikson (1971;1972), Cover (1977),
Ferejohn (1977), Mayhew (1974), Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina (1992), Ansolabehere,
Snyder, and Stewart (2000), Cox and Katz (1996;2002), Gelman and King (1990), Levitt
(1994), and Levitt and Wolfram (1997).
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need resources to win extremely competitive elections. Moreover, according
to Brazilian electoral rules candidates compete in open lists, which makes
it even more important for candidates to find ways to run individualistic
campaigns and distinguish themselves in the eyes of voters. It is hence plau-
sible that instead of making elections more democratic, removing corporate
donations would actually favor candidates that are incumbents, rich or had
a strong recall from previous elections, as these factors are expected to give
them an advantage towards undecided voters in an extremely competitive
environment.2
Another difficulty is that any causal inference related to the consequences
of the ban has to be taken very cautiously. Between 2008-2012 and 2012-2016
many changes took place in Brazil. Any increase/decrease on incumbency
effects after the ban became effective might have been influenced by these
contextual changes. For instance, any increase in the negative effect towards
incumbents might have been influenced by revelations of massive corruption
schemes involving the political establishment brought about by investigations
initiated in 2014 (Car Wash or Lava Jato investigations).
In order to investigate the effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes in
a context in which corporate donations are forbidden I propose to repeat
the procedure used in the previous chapter. Comparison would be made for
2Novas regras eleitorais favorecem candidatos apadrinhados, published in the newspa-
per O Estado de São Paulo on September 30, 2016. The article argues that in banning
corporate donations, instead of making elections more democratic, the reforms actually
favored candidates that were incumbents, rich or had a strong recall.
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the 2012 (t=0) and 2016 (t=1) elections. The second election is when the
ban became applicable due to the Supreme Court decision (according to the
Brazilian Constitution, any law/ruling that changes electoral procedures is
only applicable the year after the law was passed or the ruling was stated.
The Supreme Court decision is from 2015 and was thus applicable for the
first time to the municipal elections of 2016).
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, I present some in-
formation on campaign financing in Brazilian elections. In section 4.3 the
data is briefly presented and a few aspects of the methodology are discussed
insofar as they depart from the analysis undertaken before. In section 4.4 I
present my results and in section 4.5 I carry out some further investigation to
suggest a possible interpretation for these results. In section 4.6 I conclude.
4.2 Campaign Financing in Brazil
Brazilian campaigns are very competitive and often involve large amounts
of money. The amount of money that finances electoral campaigns has in-
creased steadily over the years up to 2016, the year corporate donations
became no longer allowed (Table 4.1).3 In 2012, the total amount raised in
national campaigns for mayor and aldermen reached 4.8 billion reais (roughly
2.4 billion US dollars at the time), of which 4.3 amounted to donations by
3Source: NGO Transparência Brasil. Retrieved from http://www.asclaras.org.br.
111
corporations and individuals combined.4
Table 4.1: Funds for campaign financing in Brazilian elections









Elections are particularly competitive due to some specific characteris-
tics of the electoral system in Brazil. Elections to legislative positions are
carried out on the basis of open-list representations and candidates compete
against candidates from their own party as well as from opposing party or-
ganizations. Aldermen, state representatives and congressmen are chosen in
districts extending from their own municipality (in the case of aldermen) to
the whole federal state (in the case of state representatives and congressmen)
and are used to face a big number of competitors. Even in the case of candi-
dates for executive positions like mayors, state governors and president, it is
common to have a fair amount of candidates. In 2012, there were on average
3 candidates for each mayoral seat in dispute. In the case of aldermen, this
4Previously to 2016, Brazilian electoral regulations were more liberal as to potential
sources of financing. Corporations could legally donate up to 2% of their total revenue
prior to taxes, earned the year before the election. Other sources of financing included
personal donations (limited to 10% of the total revenue prior to taxes, earned the year
before the election), public funds and candidate’s own resources.
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figure amounted to 7.8 candidates per seat.
Moreover, in Brazil the amount of parties is particularly huge (currently
35) and voters face difficulty when trying to distinguish candidates from so
many parties from each other. With the exception of the Workers’ Party
(Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT ), Brazilian parties usually have no more
than 6-7% of the electorate as sympathizers (Samuels 2006). There is public
funding for campaigns, but these funds are allocated only to parties, not
candidates. Public money is usually only a small part of what is actually
spent in campaigns. All this works as a strong incentive for candidates to
campaign individually in an attempt to distinguish themselves from their
opponents. In running their campaigns, candidates have a strong incentive
to raise as much money as possible, as this gives them important means to
stand out among their peers.
There is a relatively well developed literature in Brazil on the influence
of campaign financing - notably through corporate donations - on the per-
formance of candidates. Focusing mostly on elections to the federal house of
representatives and the senate in different years, these studies have identified
a positive association between the amount of money raised/spent by candi-
dates, the vote shares they receive and whether they were elected or not.5
One study (Cervi (2010)) focused on elections for mayor in state capitals in
2008 and reached similar conclusions. This is also the case of Heiler (2011),
5This is the case, for instance, of Samuels (2001a, 2002); Pereira e Renno (2007);
Peixoto (2009); Figueiredo Filho (2009); Marcelino (2010); Lemos, Marcelino and Pederiva
(2010); Figueiredo Filho et al. (2011); and Mancuso and Speck (2012).
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who focused on municipalities in the Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, with
similar conclusions.
The literature in Brazil has also found some evidence of the so called “Ja-
cobson Effect”, that is, the finding that campaign spending is more effective
for challengers than for incumbents, suggesting hence that limits on cam-
paign financing/spending tend to favor those already in office (Figueiredo
Filho (2009), Peixoto (2010)).
The literature has so far focused relatively little on municipal elections
and has practically overlooked the issue of interaction between incumbency
and corporate financing. In this study I propose to fill this gap.
Assuming that incumbency offers candidates potential advantages like
easier name recognition, what should be expected once corporate donations
can no longer be legally used to finance campaigns? In a country like Brazil,
where spending is a crucial element for winning a seat, removing a critical
resource like corporate donations should increase the weight of other pos-
sible advantages - like incumbency - enjoyed by particular candidates. If
spending by challengers has a greater impact on the outcome than by in-
cumbents, limiting the amount of money at the disposal of candidates would
help incumbents. My main hypothesis is thus that the negative effect faced




To investigate the effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes I have used a
dataset with information publicly available from the Superior Electoral Tri-
bunal (TSE), in the same format as described in the previous paper. The
data related to elections in 2012 (t=0) and 2016 (t=1) was downloaded in
multiple files, which had to be merged to form a unique dataset. Our dataset
contains 22,141 observations from the 26 Brazilian states. For each candidate
we inserted basic personal information like name, tax identification number,
educational level, occupation, etc. The donations received had to be ag-
gregated by candidate and separated according to their origin, for instance,
whether they came from a corporation, from the party, from individuals or
were funds from the candidate himself/herself. Elections for mayoral posts
are decided according to a majority principle, while the city council is elected
using an open list proportional representation system (see previous chapter
for a detailed discussion).
In 2012, the average vote share of mayor candidates was 25% (median
28%). Winning candidates were elected with vote shares starting at a mere
20% and averaging 37% (The average losing candidate in 2012 had 17% of
vote shares).
Candidates for local councils were elected in 2012 with an average 3% of
vote shares. The average vote share of candidates stayed around 1.7% while
losing candidates received, on average, less than 1% of vote shares. Tables
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4.2 and 4.3 present the distribution of candidates’ pretreatment covariates
that do not change over time.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 2012 Mayor Candidates (N=3,841)
mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.11 0.897
Black 0.16 0.03 0.001
Primary Education 0.06 0.06 0.816
Middle School 0.26 0.25 0.343
Lawyer 0.06 0.07 0.067
Salesman 0.07 0.07 0.847
PMDB 0.19 0.13 0.000
PSDB 0.13 0.09 0.002
Sao Paulo 0.10 0.13 0.014
Minas Gerais 0.16 0.16 0.543
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics 2012 Aldermen Candidates (N=18,300)
mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.22 0.000
Black 0.05 0.12 0.000
Primary Education 0.13 0.14 0.039
Middle School 0.36 0.36 0.902
Lawyer 0.02 0.01 0.173
Salesman 0.09 0.08 0.739
PMDB 0.13 0.01 0.000
PSDB 0.08 0.02 0.000
Sao Paulo 0.12 0.37 0.000
Minas Gerais 0.14 0.13 0.349
For the diff-in-diff analysis, I have matched candidates using the propen-
sity score (the probability that the unit will be assigned to treatment, in
our case that the candidate will be elected in 2012) and the different sources
of funds received as predictors. We used as matching algorithm the single
nearest-neighbor, where an individual from the comparison group is chosen
as a matching partner for a treated individual that is closest in terms of the
propensity score.
One of the advantages of using the diff-in-diff analysis, as explained in
the previous chapter, is that individual characteristics of candidates that
could bias our estimate are canceled out in the end. However, in the cur-
rent investigation, the fact that individual candidates have at t=0 access to
different amounts of corporate money makes our analysis more complex and
potentially biased. Using the propensity score enables us to circumvent this
problem and compare incumbents and challengers who had access to similar
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amounts. By doing this, we are able to assess what kind of advantage can or
cannot be attributed to incumbency alone once candidates are in a similar
position as regards to financial resources at their disposal (Figures 4.1 and
4.2 display the bias reduction after we carry out the matching).
Figure 4.1: Bias Reduction after matching mayor candidates 2012 Election
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Figure 4.2: Bias Reduction after matching aldermen candidates 2012 Election
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As corporate donations are equal to zero at time t=1 (2016 election), it is
important that the amount of corporate donations raised is balanced across
treatment and control groups at time t=0 (2012 election). By ensuring this
we will be able to compare candidates that, on average, were similarly af-
fected by the loss of corporate donations due to the Supreme Court decision
and whose main difference is treatment status (being elected at t=0). As
indicated in tables 4.4 and 4.5, our matching procedure ensures that our
treatment and control groups are fairly equivalent in covariate distribution.6
6Sex and professional activities are dummy variables; level of education is categorized
from 1 to 7. Corporate donations are measured as the natural log of the amount received
in Brazilian reais.
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Table 4.4: 2012 Mayor Candidate Sample Descriptive Statistics before and
after matching (N=3,841)
unmatched/matched treated control p-value
Corporate Donations U 6.31 5.33 0.000
M 6.31 6.28 0.863
Individual contributions U 9.11 7.90 0.000
M 9.11 9.07 0.678
Own resources U 8.47 7.53 0.000
M 8.47 8.49 0.904
Table 4.5: 2012 Aldermen Candidate Sample Descriptive Statistics before
and after matching (N=18,300)
unmatched/matched treated control p-value
Corporate Donations U 1.53 0.64 0.000
M 1.53 1.57 0.365
Individual contributions U 5.04 2.01 0.000
M 5.04 5.23 0.000
Own resources U 6.95 3.06 0.000
M 6.95 7.03 0.067
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Diff-in-diff Analysis
Table 4.6 presents our results for mayor candidates. It displays the average
vote share for treatment and control groups, as well as difference in average
vote shares in 2012 and 2016 and the p-value for testing the statistical sig-
nificance of that difference. As show in table 4.6, the evaluation carried out
for the sample of mayor candidates (executive post/majority election) found
an overall effect of incumbency equivalent to a decrease in 15 per cent in the
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difference in vote shares between treatment and control groups from 2012 to
2016 (95% CI[-0.17,-0.14], Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, ATT ).
Table 4.6: Effect of Incumbency - Mayoral Elections 2016 (N=3,841)
treatment control diff test diff=0
2012 0.55 0.34 0.21 0.000
2016 0.47 0.41 0.06 0.000
effect - - -0.15 0.000
In 2012, when the average winning vote share and average winning vote
margin for all mayoral candidates were 0.57 and 0.23, respectively, in our
sample winners averaged 0.55 in vote shares and 0.21 in winning vote margin.
In 2016, while the average winning vote share and average winning vote
margin for all candidates were 0.57 and 0.25, in our sample these estimates
were 0.47 and 0.06.
Contrary to our initial expectations, rerunning mayors continued to face
a negative effect related to their incumbent status and this effect had an
increase of almost four percentage points in the period, from 0.11 to 0.15.7
There is no overlap with the confidence interval we found for the baseline pe-
riod, which was [-0.13,-0.09], indicating that the magnitude of the coefficient
did change from 2012 to 2016. It is possible that this effect is partly due
to the fact that incumbent mayors could no longer access corporate money
to fund their campaigns.8 However, as it will discussed below in section 5,
7We use 0.11 as our baseline since it depicts the average treatment effect of incumbency
found in the previous paper, when we carried out exactly the same analysis comparing the
performance of incumbents and challengers that faced each other in 2008 and 2012.
8In the 2008, 77% of the total funds for campaign of incumbent mayors and challengers
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between 2008-2012 and 2012-2016 many changes took place in Brazil and
it is reasonable to expect that some of them contributed to the identified
decrease in vote shares.
Turning to city council candidates (table 4.7), who were not examined
previously in the literature, we find that the effect of incumbency was also
negative and equivalent to a decrease of 1.1 per cent in the difference in vote
shares from 2012 to 2016 (95% CI [-0.012,-0.009], ATT ). In 2012, the average
vote share for winners in our sample was 0.09 and the average winning vote
margin was 0.06. In 2016, winning candidates for city councils averaged 0.09
of vote shares in our sample, while the average winning vote margin was 0.05.
Table 4.7: Effect of Incumbency - City Council Elections 2016 (N=18,300)
treatment control diff test diff=0
2012 0.089 0.022 0.066 0.000
2016 0.087 0.032 0.055 0.000
effect - - -0.011 0.000
It must be stressed, however, that in the case of aldermen candidates,
although matching was successful with regards to corporate donations and
individual contributions, perfect balance was not achieved for the own re-
sources spent by candidates. I do not believe that this invalidates the analy-
sis though. The mean difference between unmatched and matched samples is
equivalent to 3.97, which correspond roughly to 53 Reais (around 14 dollars).
The difference corresponds to a small amount that should not significantly
came from corporate donations. In 2012 that amount was close to 95%, according to the
NGO Transparência Brasil.
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change the average fate of individual candidates.
When we look at legislative candidates, we realize that the negative effect
of incumbency almost doubled, from 0.6 percent in 2012 to 1.1 percent in
2016.9 Incumbent aldermen also suffer from a negative effect and this effect
increased from 2012 to 2016. Also here the indication of change is persuasive,
as there is no overlapping with the confidence interval of the baseline period
([-0.009,-0.003].10 These results are somewhat unexpected in view of the
nature of municipal politics in Brazil and reinforce the findings of negative
effect towards incumbents in general in the 2016 election. In Brazil voters
tend to attribute to the Municipal Executive the problems (and eventually
the merits) of public administration in the city. This identification is much
weaker in the case of members of the Legislative branch, whose daily work
does not draw much attention from the average voter. The impossibility of
using corporate money to fund campaigns is one possible explanation to this
loss of vote shares by incumbent aldermen.11 However, as already mentioned
above, elections in 2016 took place in the context of a strong political crisis
where politicians from bigger and smaller parties were caught in scandals
involving public money, making it probably harder for incumbents looking
9The magnitude of the coefficient - much smaller for aldermen - is partly explained by
the fact that candidates for mayor receive much bigger vote shares, as they are elected
according to a majority rule.
10The corresponding analysis for the baseline period was also carried out in the previous
paper, when we compared the performance of incumbents and challengers facing each other
in 2008 and 2012.
11According to the NGO Transparência Brasil, in 2008 70% of the budget of incumbents
and challengers for aldermen positions came from corporations. In 2012, that amount
peaked at more than 90%.
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for reelection to get votes. The effects of the scandals at the federal level
might have impacted municipal elections as well and created a general “anti-
incumbency” sentiment among voters.
In any case, the diff-in-diff analysis indicates that incumbents continued
to face a negative effect when running for reelection in 2016 and this effect




As a way to complement the analysis using repeated pairs of candidates,
I also checked the effect of incumbency in the 2012/2016 elections through
a regression discontinuity design, as described earlier. Figure 4.3 displays
the discontinuity point around the cutoff using all observations for mayor in
our sample.12 We see a clear “jump” at the discontinuity point, which sug-
gests a negative effect of incumbency for mayor candidates in the regression
discontinuity estimates.
Using a local linear regression and bandwidth=0.098, a negative statisti-
cally significant estimate was found which was close to the one from the diff-
in-diff analysis, although slightly smaller (-0.15 versus -0.13). The confidence
interval here was 95% CI [-0.17,-0.09]. The estimate remained statistically
12The y axis displays the margin of victory when time t=1 (2016 election); the x axis
displays the margin of victory when time t=0 (2012 election).
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significant and practically unaltered when we resorted to local polynomials
of order 2 and 3 and larger bandwidths equal to 0.166 and 0.218 (Table 4.8).
The assumptions for inference in the case of mayor candidates are met.
Table 4.9 presents the distribution of covariates for our smallest bandwidth.
Balance is present in most cases, indicating that the assumptions are met.
Balance is also present when the larger bandwidths are used (tables 4.10
and 4.11). There is however an overlap with the confidence interval in the
baseline period (95% CI [-0.13, -0.06]), indicating that we must be careful
when interpreting the results as a clear indication of change over the previous
period in the case of close mayor elections.
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Table 4.8: Effect of Incumbency Mayoral Elec-
tions 2016 - RD estimates
vote margin ≤ 0.098 ≤ 0.166 ≤ 0.218
point estimate τ -0.13 -0.13 -0.14
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 1,702 2,406 2,776
The DV for the regression discontinuity is the vote margin in 2016,
scaled from -1 to 1, which is regressed against the vote margin in
2012 (scaled the same way), a dummy variable for treatment and an
interaction term. We use a local linear regression, a polynomial of
order 2 and of order 3, respectively.
Table 4.9: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.098 (N=1,702)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.12 0.12 0.70
Married 0.77 0.71 0.002
Primary Education 0.063 0.069 0.62
Middle School 0.27 0.26 0.53
College 0.50 0.47 0.28
Lawyer 0.06 0.06 0.98
Salesman 0.07 0.08 0.40
Businessman 0.18 0.15 0.14
Party: PSDB 0.10 0.11 0.43
Party: PT 0.10 0.10 0.63
Party: PMDB 0.21 0.18 0.21
SP 0.07 0.11 0.008
MG 0.14 0.16 0.11
RJ 0.014 0.010 0.42
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Table 4.10: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.166 (N=2,406)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.12 0.87
Married 0.77 0.72 0.007
Primary Education 0.061 0.065 0.70
Middle School 0.27 0.25 0.33
College 0.50 0.48 0.40
Lawyer 0.06 0.07 0.52
Salesman 0.07 0.08 0.45
Businessman 0.16 0.15 0.40
Party: PSDB 0.11 0.10 0.45
Party: PT 0.11 0.10 0.49
Party: PMDB 0.19 0.17 0.21
SP 0.07 0.10 0.001
MG 0.14 0.17 0.10
RJ 0.014 0.018 0.42
In 2016, the group of rerunning mayors as a whole continued to face a
negative incumbency effect. They performed, on average, worse in vote shares
than runners-up from the previous election. When we focus on close elections,
this conclusion is somewhat confirmed, although we cannot be 100% sure due
to the partial overlap of confidence intervals. For the reasons explained in
the previous chapter, I have included in Appendix A the analysis where the
outcome variable is the unconditional probability of rerunning and winning.
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Table 4.11: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.218 (N=2,776)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.11 0.12 0.87
Married 0.77 0.72 0.007
Primary Education 0.06 0.06 0.97
Middle School 0.27 0.25 0.44
College 0.50 0.48 0.27
Lawyer 0.06 0.07 0.56
Salesman 0.07 0.08 0.43
Businessman 0.17 0.16 0.51
Party: PSDB 0.11 0.10 0.45
Party: PT 0.11 0.10 0.49
Party: PMDB 0.19 0.17 0.21
SP 0.08 0.11 0.002
MG 0.15 0.17 0.19
RJ 0.014 0.018 0.45
City Council candidates
Figure 4.4 displays the discontinuity around the cutoff using all observations
of city council candidates from our dataset (N=18,300). The graph shows
no visible discontinuity, suggesting that there is no distinguishable effect of
incumbency on the vote shares earned by winners in comparison to losers.
No statistically significant effect of incumbency was found in close elec-
tions where the difference in vote shares between winners and losers was
equal to 0.8% (bandwidth equal to 0.008). No statistically significant effect
was found either when larger bandwidths and polynomials of order 2 and 3
were used to carry out the regression discontinuity. Table 4.12 displays the
distribution of covariates in our sample. Balance is present in most cases.
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As it was the case with our baseline period (2008-2012), when we focus on
close disputes, there is no statistically significant effect of incumbency for city
council elections. There is, nevertheless, for the larger group of city council
candidates in our sample a visible negative effect which increased since 2012
from 0.6% to 1.1%. The reasons for this increase will be explored below.
4.5 Interpreting the Results
As stated in the introduction, when ruling in 2015 to change the norms that
regulated campaign financing in Brazil, the Supreme Court aimed at leveling
the playing field among candidates. In forbidding corporate donations to
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Table 4.12: Balance Statistics for vote margin≤ 0.008 (N=660)
variable mean treated mean control p-value
Female 0.10 0.06 0.59
Married 0.63 0.75 0.33
Primary Education 0.10 0.06 0.59
Middle School 0.36 0.37 0.89
College 0.33 0.31 0.84
Lawyer 0.04 0.06 0.71
Salesman 0.08 0.06 0.74
Businessman 0.06 0.18 0.06
Party: PSDB 0.09 0.06 0.65
Party: PT 0.11 0.06 0.52
Party: PMDB 0.10 0.00 0.16
SP 0.24 0.68 0.000
MG 0.14 0.12 0.81
RJ 0.07 0.18 0.07
candidates, the Supreme Court eliminated a valuable source of funding for
incumbents trying to get reelected and challengers trying to get elected for
the first time in 2016.
Incumbent mayors running for reelection in 2016 performed, on average,
worse in vote shares than challengers/runners-up beaten by them in 2012 and
who they faced once again in 2016. The negative effect increased in compari-
son to the performance of mayors rerunning in 2012 against challengers/runners-
up from 2008. The confidence in the increase in negative effect compared to
the previous period was strengthened once we used a regression discontinuity
design to focus on close elections (even if we could not be totally sure due to
the partial overlapping of confidence intervals).
The situation is similar in the case of aldermen candidates, for whom cor-
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porate donations were also an important source of money, even though city
council campaigns require raising considerably smaller amounts of funds.13
Also for incumbent aldermen the performance in vote shares against challengers/
runners-up from previous election was worse in 2016 than in 2012. The aldermen 
who decided to rerun and won reelection in 2016 did so by smaller margins. In
one specific case - close elections against challengers previously faced from
the same coalition -, no effect of incumbency was found. From the analy-
sis undertaken, our main conclusion is that incumbency proved to be curse
for Brazilian mayors and aldermen and this curse got worse precisely at the
moment when firms were disallowed to fund political campaigns.
Contrary to our expectations, when they lost access to corporate money 
incumbents performed actually worse than challengers. These findings seem to 
disconfirm our main hypothesis that banning corporate donations would actually 
help incumbents. Losing corporate money did not favor incumbents, did not 
increase the weight of the so-called benefits of the office in Brazilian municipal 
electoral contests.
Elected candidates for mayor in 2012 received, on average, R$ 177,441 Brazilian 
reais in corporate donations, while in the case of unsuccessful can-didates that 
amount was R$ 104,923 Brazilian reais. Once this source of advantage could no 
longer be used by candidates in 2016, one should expect the weight of office to shift 
the electoral contest in favor of previously elected
13While the average mayor candidate in 2012 raised 183,000 Brazilian reais, the average 
city council candidate raised merely 3,900 Brazilian reais.
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candidates. However, the opposite took place. Why is it so? How does
the the impossibility to raise money from corporations relate - if it is the
case that it does relate - to the increase in the traditional curse of Brazilian
incumbents already noted by the literature?
One possible explanation to the fact that incumbency became an even
bigger curse in 2016 than in was in 2012 is, perhaps, that the change was due
to factors not directly related to the role of corporate donations as a source of
funding of individual campaigns. Looking at money from corporations might
not be enough to understand what happened. Perhaps there were other
factors influencing that election that made life more difficult for incumbents
running for reelection in 2016.
In order to check the plausibility of this explanation I have carried out
some further analysis in the sample of candidates that face each other in two
subsequent elections to investigate possible heterogeneous treatment effects,
i.e., whether treatment (being elected at t=0) affects differently subgroups
within our sample at t=1. I am interested in checking how groups of elected
candidates raising different amounts of money from corporations at t=0 are
affected by losing corporate money at t=1. The idea is to investigate effects
conditional on the amount of money received from firms. If the more money
is lost, the smaller the negative incumbency effect, then the increase in the
negative effect of incumbency from 2012-16 was probably due to other factors
that made incumbents unpopular.
To carry out this further investigation, I have regressed my outcome vari-
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able (variation in vote shares at t=1) against treatment and a new vari-
able corresponding to the standardized amount of money received by each
candidate from corporations. This variable was standardized by municipal-
ity. Initially we calculated the average firm contribution by candidate (total
amount of money contributed by firms in that city to a specific post divided
by the amount of candidates running for it). The variable I am interested in
is subsequently calculated dividing the amount of money actually raised by a
candidate by the municipal average (actually we use the log so as to account
for skewed data). This variable gives us a picture of how much corporate
money candidates received in relation to the average contribution in their
municipality (less than the average, the average, twice the average, etc.).
Using this variable, our sample was divided in groups according to whether
the candidate received less than the average contribution in his/her city, be-
tween one and two times the average, between two and ten times the average,
and between ten and twenty times the average. For each of these four groups
we have performed the regression as indicated above. The results for mayor
candidates are indicated in table 4.13 and figure 4.5:
Table 4.13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for Mayor candidates
(N=3,841)
treatment effect confidence interval p-value
group A (≤ average) -0.18 -0.21,-0.16 0.000
group B (1<average≤2) -0.15 -0.18,-0.14 0.000
group C (2<average≤10) -0.13 -0.15,-0.11 0.000
group D (10<average≤20) -0.08 -0.13,-0.03 0.002
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conditional on standard corporate donations
Heterogeneous TEs − 2016 Mayor Elections
The results for mayor candidates did confirm our suspicion that the more
money was lost, the smaller the negative incumbency effect. The group
of candidates receiving the largest amounts of corporate donations (group
D) was the least affected by the decrease in vote shares conditioned on the
amount of money received. In other words, candidates who received bigger
donations did suffer from an anti-incumbency effect as found earlier, but this
effect was smaller than the average negative effect endured by incumbent
mayors overall.
The situation described is somewhat different when we look at city council
candidates. In 2012, while elected city council candidates received an average
R$ 3,698 Brazilian reais from corporations, in the case of losing candidates
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that amount was merely R$ 118 reais. Repeating the procedure indicated
above with city council candidates, we find the following results when we
investigate the effects of incumbency on groups conditional on the amount
of corporate donations received (table 4.14 and figure 4.6).
Table 4.14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects for City Council candidates
(N=18,300)
treatment effect confidence interval p-value
group A (≤ average) -0.009 -0.014,-0.004 0.000
group B (1<average≤2) -0.010 -0.015,-0.005 0.000
group C (2<average≤10) -0.013 -0.017,-0.008 0.000
group D (10<average≤20) -0.015 -0.021,-0.009 0.000





−.02 −.015 −.01 −.005
A= less than avg; B= 1 to 2 times avg; C= 2 do 10 avg; D= 10 to 20 times avg 
conditional on standardized corporate contributions
Heterogeneous TEs − City Council Elections 2016
In the case of city council candidates, our investigation showed that the
more the money lost by a candidate, the bigger was the size of the negative
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effect suffered. This suggests that the performance of these incumbents was
more affected by the money lost due to the Supreme Court decision than what
was the case with mayor candidates. However, we have to take this conclusion
with some skepticism due to the overlapping of confidence intervals shown in
figure 4.6.
In 2016 only 48% of the mayors who tried reelection managed to win office
a second time. In 2012 this rate was 54%, and in previous elections since
2000 it had always stayed close to 60% (Superior Electoral Tribunal, 2016).
However, our findings indicate that it is difficult to attribute any difficulty of
incumbents to get reelected due to a worse performance in vote shares to the
the Supreme Court decision. In the case of mayors, this is due to the fact
that those in office actually benefited from the decision. In the case of city
council candidates, our findings were less conclusive, but give no grouds to
rule out that their were also affected by a general anti-incumbency feeling by
voters. In any case, looking at the historical context offers additional insight
as to the attitude of rejection towards incumbents in 2016 and might give
additional clues as to the increased negative effect of incumbency.
From 2000 to 2011, the Brazilian economy grew, on average, 4% a year,
as the country benefited from a long cycle of expansion in the global economy
stimulated by the growth of the real estate sector in the US and a strong
“boom” in commodities consumption in China. In this period, there was
a substantial increase in the income of Brazilian families, a steady decrease
in unemployment rates and the expansion of domestic credit, especially for
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poorer families (BNDES, 2012). Combined with distributive policies carried
out by the successive governments of the Worker’s Party, these factors help
explain the positive assessment of the Federal Government at the end of
2011: according to a public survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of
Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE), 56% of respondents considered the
performance of President Dilma Roussef excellent.
This situation changed dramatically after 2011, as the economic team
of President Rousseff carried out a number of policies that led to inflation
and economic stagnation and did not allow the country to recover from the
global financial crisis. More importantly, a huge political scandal became
public as of 2014 disclosing the involvement of high-level business people and
top politicians in Government and Congress in a money laundering scheme
related to the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras. The scandal (known as
Lava Jato or Car Wash investigations) led to massive street demonstrations
against the Government and politicians in general, and was one key element
in the process that led to the subsequent impeachment of President Rousseff.
Although it is difficult to estimate how much the discredit of politicians
at the federal level influences the mood of voters at the municipal level, it
is a fact of the matter that Brazilians in 2016 displayed a very low level
of confidence towards politicians in general. The public trust in politicians
index, published by the World Economic Forum, indicates, for instance, that
the trust in politicians in Brazil decreased steadily from 2011 (when it peaked
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at 2.07) to its lowest point in 2016 (when it scored 1,33).14
Another element that helps understand the difficulty of incumbents in
Brazilian cities to get reelected in 2016 is related to the financial crisis that
affected municipalities during the second term of Dilma Rousseff. When ap-
proving the Budget for 2015-2016, Dilma made severe cuts to the original
proposal approved by Congress. These cuts were justified in order to achieve
fiscal balance, amounting to 11.3 billion reais. The impact of the cuts was
particularly hard on Brazilian municipalities, as only 10% of them collects
enough taxes to fund its own expenses. In most cases, Brazilian municipali-
ties heavily depend on cash transfers from the federal government to deliver
services. Combined with the general economic crisis, the decreasing transfer
of resources from the Union disrupted the functioning of regular municipal
services like health, and might have added to the general anti-incumbency
sentiment to explain the poorer electoral performance incumbents, particu-
larly mayors, in comparison to their record of four years before.15
14According to the methodology adopted by the World Economic Forum,
trust in politicians range from 1=extremely low to 7=extremely high. See
https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators for further details
15The impact of the national economic crisis on cash transfers from the federal govern-
ment to municipalities was amply reported by the media. See, for instance, the piece of
news 60% das cidades terão rombo nas contas, published by the newspaper Folha de São
Paulo on may 28, 2016, which reports that at least 60% of municipalities were in deficit
due to the decrease in cash transfer from the Union.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this final chapter we have used used two complementary approaches (difference-
in-difference and regression discontinuity) to investigate whether and how a
judicial ban on corporate donations declared by the Brazilian Supreme Court
(STF) in 2015 would affect the electoral performance of mayor and city coun-
cil incumbents. The starting point for this investigation was the assumption
that limiting the sources of campaign funds would tip the balance of the
following electoral contest in favor of incumbents.
Using public available data released by the Superior Electoral Tribunal
(TSE) we initially found, contrary to our initial expectations, that the 2016
municipal elections were harder for incumbent mayors and aldermen. On the
one hand, this result could be interpreted as an indication that the Supreme
Court’s decision brought an improvement to the electoral perspectives of chal-
lengers in increasingly competitive contests. However, a closer examination
shows that the picture is slightly more complicated.
Our heterogeneous treatment effects investigation indicated that incum-
bent mayors actually benefited from the ban on corporate donations, pointing
thus in the direction of our main hypothesis stated in 4.1, that is, that the
ban on corporate donations would tip the balance of elections in favor of
candidates in office. However, as incumbent mayors in 2016 endured an in-
creased negative effect on their electoral performance, this can only be due
to the out-of-the ordinary circumstances in which the 2016 elections took
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place, under the influence of the revelations of massive financial scandals at
the federal level, and the financial crisis of Brazilian municipalities in 2015-
2016, which disrupted the regular provision of public services, justifying thus
a general mistrust nurtured by voters towards politicians, especially incum-
bent mayors.
Hence, the heterogeneous treatment effect analysis confirmed our suspi-
cion that the increased negative effect of incumbency was probably due, in
the case of incumbent mayors, to other factors that would justify an anti-
incumbency attitude by voters. The many changes in the political and eco-
nomical landscape in Brazil between 2012 and 2016 explain the increased
negative effect of incumbency, but, as far as the ban is concerned, its effect
was to actually help incumbents, even if this benefit was overwhelmed by the
influence of other factors.
In the case of city councillor candidates, there was an increase in the
negative effect of incumbency and they might have been affected by the
loss of corporate donations, but our findings on this were less conclusive.
We cannot rule out, in view of the increased negative effect to which they




Conclusion: the way forward
In this work we have explained the process of institutional change that led
in 2015 the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) to
ban corporate donations as a lawful source of financing to political cam-
paigns. The process of change was the outcome of relatively exceptional
circumstances combining the increasing judicialization of politics with the
temporary suspension of long identified patterns of interaction between the
Executive and the Congress in Brazil.
The historical Supreme Court decision, whatever its effects to level the
playing field among candidates might have been, did not scratch the struc-
tural characteristics of the Brazilian electoral system that turned corporate
donations into such an essential element for the success of contestants, in par-
ticular a system that combines large districts with open-list representation.
This fact notwithstanding, the Court’s decision has not been challenged since
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it became public. It enjoys support from the public, who saw in it a posi-
tive measure to curb the corruption that for years plagued Brazilian politics,
details of which were revealed by the Car Wash investigations.
Deprived of corporate funding, politicians had to adapt and turned to
public money as a means to compensate for their loss. The Court’s decision
created thus the necessary conditions for a new - and so far stable - regime
of campaign financing funded mostly through public funds.1
Among the findings of this research, perhaps the most significant is that
the Court’s decision did favor incumbent candidates, especially incumbent
mayors. Contrary to the expectations of its proponents, more than helping
challengers, the ban seems to have helped those mayors already in office.
The second important finding was that the negative effect on incumbents
identified was visible both in the case of executive positions (city mayors) and
legislative offices (city council officials) and that it had increased significantly
from 2012 to 2016. For reasons explained in the last chapter, it is difficult to
categorically attribute the identified increased negative effect to the decision
of the Supreme Court. The specific historic context in 2016 suggests a number
of reasons for which voters should be particularly unhappy with incumbent
politicians.
Be that as it may, this study was the first attempt in the literature to
1According to the Superior Electoral Tribunal, TSE, in the general elections held in
2018 in Brazil, 80% of the resources spent by candidates came from public funds. In
addition, in 2019, the TSE established caps on the amount of money individuals could
donate to candidates, as well as on the amount of their own money candidates could invest
to fund themselves. This turned the system even more dependent on public funding.
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understand a regime change in electoral rules while at the same time inves-
tigating its possible effects in parallel majority and proportional elections.
One limitation of our study is that we only investigated the effects on incum-
bency in the contest held immediately after the Supreme Court decision. As
that election took place under rather rare circumstances, it would be impor-
tant to extend the research to later elections as well. This would allow us
to have a clearer understanding of the reasons behind the negative effect of
incumbency and its relation to the loss of corporate money.
Another limitation is that our investigation remained restricted to legal
donations, donations that the candidates, in fulfillment of legal requirements,
had to declare to the Supreme Electoral Court, which subsequently compiled
it and made it public. Bearing in mind Justice Mendes’ warning, it is entirely
plausible that banning corporate donations produced the undesired effect
of actually stimulating unreported, off the books contributions by sponsors
deprived of the legal means to support their candidates, as well as increased
(legal) donations by individuals connected with firms that used to donate.
Checking whether this was actually the case, however difficult it might be
to find evidence of off the books donations, is something important which
remains to be done.
Finally, as we moved to a financing regime funded mostly by public re-
sources, it would be important to understand better how these funds are
being managed and who benefits the most from them. Has the new, pub-
lic regime increased the strength of party leadership (historically weak in a
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country like Brazil) and their favorites at the expense of younger politicians?
If this is the case, what are the consequences of this new dynamics to parties
and to the democratic system as a whole? These are relevant questions that





The analysis according to the methodology described above was carried out
considering candidates who repeatedly face each other in two subsequent elec-
tions. By conditioning on rerunning we are able to compare the same two
candidates across elections and can thus offset any possible effect on perfor-
mance due to individual characteristics. This is especially relevant in the
diff-in-diff analysis. In the RD analysis, candidates should by construction
share the same background characteristics. That being the case, our confi-
dence would be strengthened that any effect found is not due to individual
traits of particular candidates.
The side-effect of conditioning on rerunning is, however, that we are inten-
tionally making one group stronger than the other. This sample restriction
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implies a selection bias, not only because winners and runner-ups/challengers
do not always rerun at the same rates, but also because the choice of whether
to rerun might depend on whether one is elected or not at time t=0. Usually,
the runner-ups/challengers who decide to run again are those who believe
they will do well in the future election. It is reasonable to assume that they
are stronger than average challengers at t=0. For incumbents, it is considered
a fact that they seek reelection - although in Brazil this is true of mayors, but
not so much of city council members. This is due to the widespread assump-
tion that holding office gives financial, strategic or informational advantages.
In 2012, 74% of the mayors legally entitled to run for a second term
decided to do so. They represented 2,736 candidates out of a total universe
of 5,668 mayoral positions in dispute. Out of these, 55% (1,505) succeeded
in being reelected. In the case of aldermen (for which there is no limit to the
number of reelections), 24% attempted a second mandate and 84% of them
(21,550 candidates) were successful.
As a way to deal with these methodological questions, it has been sug-
gested that a more adequate measure of incumbency advantage is the indi-
vidual and unconditional incumbency effect on the probability of rerunning
and winning. The literature also points out that estimating unconditional
incumbency effects facilitates comparisons between countries and political
systems (Magalhães 2015).
In this alternative measure, the whole universe of winners and challengers
at time t=0 is considered. The outcome variable, instead of the variation in
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vote shares, takes the value 1 if the politician reruns and wins the election at
t=1 and takes the value 0 if the politician does not run or loses at the second
election. Once the unconditional estimate is defined, we proceed with a RD
analysis to check whether there is a statistically significant difference in the
means across treatment and control groups.
E[Y1i − Y0i] = (E[Y1i|R1i = 1]− E[Y0i|R0i = 1] ∗ E[R1i = 1] + E[Y0i|R0i =
1] ∗ E[R1i −R0i]
In this equation we define the average treatment of incumbency advantage
as the term E[Y1i−Y0i], which represents the probability of running and being
elected. The indicator variable Yi takes value 1 if the politician runs and is
elected, and 0 otherwise. In this equation, taken from Magalhaes 2014, we
see how the unconditional incumbency advantage relates to the conditional
incumbency advantage, the term E[Y1i|R1i = 1]. The indicator variable Ri
takes value 1 if the politician runs and 0 otherwise.
Table A.1 presents the effect of incumbency on the unconditional proba-
bility of rerunning and winning election for mayoral positions at time t=1.
We restrict the sample to elections where the difference in vote share is equal
or less than 2% and use a local-averages method to calculate the effect.
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Table A.1: Effect of Incumbency - Unconditional Probability RD esti-
mates - Mayoral Elections 2012
rerun winner 2008 rerun challenger 2008 Diff Test Diff=0 N
0.21 0.32 -0.10 0.000 816
For this RD analysis we have used a window of 2% difference in vote shares between winners and
challengers. The DV is the unconditional probability of running a second time and being reelected.
In this DV, we code 1 for incumbents and challengers who rerun in 2012 and win and zero for the
others. The estimation was made through mean differences.
Around 22% of bare winners in 2008 win reelection in 2012. In the case
of bare losers, 32% of those who rerun win in the following election. The
effect of incumbency is defined as the difference between these two averages,
which accounts for a statistically significant negative effect of -0.10 (95%
CI[-0.16,-0.045].
Surprisingly, when we use a regression discontinuity design to calculate
the effects of incumbency as the unconditional probability of rerunning and
winning among city council candidates, we find a statistically significant pos-
itive effect of +0.21 [CI 95% +0.19,+0.24]. Again, as with mayor candidates,
we restrict our sample to close elections (margin of victory/defeat not exceed-
ing 2%). Winners are candidates with the lowest vote share among those
elected from a certain coalition; losers are candidates who got the highest
vote shares among those not elected from the same coalition. This last result
suggests that incumbent aldermen have a better chance than challengers to
win a reelection. Calculating the odds, we find that they are 20% higher in
the case of winners in 2008 that they will rerun and win the second election
(table A.2).
Identifying incumbency vote effects on the vote share can be problematic,
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Table A.2: Effect of Incumbency - Unconditional Probability
- City Council Elections 2012
winner 2008 runner-up 2008 Diff Test Diff=0 N
0.14 0.35 0.210 0.000 4,345
For this RD analysis we have used a window of 2% difference in vote shares between
winners and runners-up. The DV is the unconditional probability of running a second
time and winning. We code 1 for candidates who rerun and win, and 0 otherwise.
The estimation was made through mean differences.
however, as it implies that we must condition on rerunning, and this is likely
to bias the results. Once we focus on the probability of rerunning and winning
as our outcome variable, the results found indicated a clear average negative
effect for incumbent mayors.
In the case of aldermen our results suggest that incumbency is an advan-
tage, but we should not rely excessively on this estimate, as non-rerunners
are heavily concentrated on the side of losers from the first election and are
coded as 0 in this analysis. In our restricted sample where the margin of
victory/defeat did not exceed 2%, out of 3,154 candidates for the city coun-
cil who were not elected in 2008, only 528 took the chance of running again
in 2012. Among the 2,227 winners in 2008, 1,454 ran again in 2012. The
rate of rerunning candidates is thus much higher among winners than among
losers at t=0. Compared to losers in 2008, the odds are three times higher
for winners in that election that they will run again in 2012. One possible
explanation for this is that some losing candidates decided to run for a higher
office - in our sample, 109 candidates for aldermen ran for mayor in 2012 and
57 ran for the state legislative council in the subsequent election for that
body, held in 2010. Most probably, however, is that not being professional
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politicians, these loosing candidates gave their life a different direction after
the election. Not being professional politicians, non-rerunners have strong
incentives to resume their previous activities after they lose an election and
most probably opt for not ”giving it a try” in the subsequent election. For
this reason, I believe using the unconditional probability is not advisable in
the case of proportional city council elections and have decided to include
this section as an appendix.
We have used the unconditional probability of rerunning and winning at
the 2016 election as outcome variable to carry out a second RD analysis.
Our sample was enlarged to include not only the candidates who ran in
both elections, but also those who ran in 2012 but did not do so in 2016.
Using this outcome variable, we code 1 for those candidates who rerun and
win and zero for all the others. We restrict our sample to those elections
where candidates win/lose by a 2% margin (1,000 observations) and use a
local-averages method to calculate the effect.
Table A.3: Effect of Incumbency - Unconditional Probability RD esti-
mates - Mayoral Elections 2016
rerun winner 2012 rerun challenger 2012 Diff Test Diff=0 N
0.16 0.29 -0.13 0.000 1004
For this RD analysis we have used a window of 2% difference in vote shares between winners and
runners-up. The estimation was made through mean differences.
Among all candidates in 2012, 18% stood for reelection (incumbents and
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non-incumbents). Among more than 5,200 mayors, almost 40% ran for re-
election (many of the incumbent mayors could not legally run again, for they
were already in their second mandate) and 21% got reelected (around 54%
of those who tried reelection). Among candidates not elected in 2012, 67%
decided not to run again in 2016. Only 33% ran in 2016, of which 16% won
the election (47% of those not elected in 2012 who ran again in 2016).
In our restricted sample, 16% of rerunning incumbents managed to win re-
election. Among challengers, that rate was 29%. The effect we are interested
in is the difference between these two values. Consistent with our previous
results, we find that incumbent mayors in 2016 were subject to a statistically
significant negative effect equivalent to -0.13 (95% CI[-0.18, -0.08]), once this
effect is measured as the unconditional probability of rerunning and winning.
As explained in the previous paper, the analysis using the unconditional
probability of rerunning and being reelected as outcome variable was not
carried out for city council candidates, since its assumptions do not hold in
the case of proportional elections.
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Profissão e Partido: a vitória na eleição para deputado federal no Brasil em
2010. Revista Sociedade e Estado 30(1): 189-205.
CNI-Ibope. Avaliação do Governo. March 2016. Retrieved from
http://arquivos.portaldaindustria.com.br/app/cni estatistica 2/2016/03/30/31/
Pesquisa CNI-IBOPE Avaliacao do Governo Marco2016 Relatorio de 
divulgacao.pdf
Collier, D.& Munck, G.L. 2017. Building Blocks and Methodological
Challenges: A Framework for Studying Critical Junctures. Qualitative &
Multi-Method Research. Spring, Vol.15(1).
Congresso Nacional. 1992. Relatório Final da Comissão Mista Parlamentar
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